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ABSTRACT: This Article identifies an overlooked criminalization gap. While
the existence of a private sphere in which violence is allowed has been formally
repudiated, a subtler form of legal immunity persists. Relationship status-that
is, whether or not a couple is involved in an ongoing relationship-continues to
construct crime. Though physical violence between intimate partners is
categorically outlawed, patterns of controlling behavior that encompass
physical violence may or may not be lawful. These patterns of controlling
behavior are legally permitted when two people are together. Yet these same
patterns become illegal if, and only if, the couple separates. The law thus
prohibits behavior that it permits before the breakup. I call this the de facto
separation requirement and offer a conceptual framework that explains its
endurance. On analysis, the differential treatment of pre- and post-breakup
patterns cannot be justified.
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INTRODUCTION
The most commonplace violence-violence between intimate partners-Is
different from other types of violent crime.' When it is embedded in a
relationship, violence spans time. Unlike other violence, intimate partner
violence is not episodic, nor is it limited to the realm of the physical. Incidents
of acute battering are connected by dynamics of power and control. This kind
of violence cannot be understood without reference to context. Its harms
encompass not just bodily injury, but fear and diminished autonomy. 2
The law fails to incorporate these generally accepted truths. Though
domestic violence is formally outlawed, insofar as longstanding statutes are
now used for prosecution, its essence remains outside the reach of existing
criminal law, which prohibits only discrete incidents of physical injury.
Patterns of control are overlooked, and context-meaning that which occurs in
the interstices of physical violence-all but disappears. 3
Until, that is, the moment of perceived separation. When relationships
"end," stalking begins. Quite suddenly, context matters; ongoing conduct
becomes legally significant, as do the nonphysical harms that result when a
person is subjected to power and control.4 In its approach to stalking, the law
adopts a model of crime that, nomenclature aside, seems more closely aligned
with the realities of domestic violence.
This becomes even more apparent when we juxtapose the post-separation
conduct that is criminalized with the pre-separation conduct that is not, for they
are of a piece. Both represent ongoing efforts to exert power and control, using
1. According to 2011 figures from the first National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey,
more than one in three women in the United States has "experienced rape, physical violence, and/or
stalking by an intimate partner in their lifetime." MICHELE C. BLACK ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL AND PREVENTION, NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY 2 (2011)
[hereinafter NISVS].
2. See infra notes 23-42 and accompanying text. See also infra Section II.B.
3. See infra Section II.A.
4. See infra Section II.B.
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a wide range of mechanisms that inflict a broad spectrum of injury. If this
happens when we perceive that a relationship is over, we call it stalking; but if
it occurs when the relationship is viewed as continuing, we do not. Thus the
moment of the "breakup" becomes not only legally meaningful, but dispositive
of whether a crime has even occurred.5 Yet until now, no notice has been given
to how relationship status constructs crime.
This Article is the first to identify and critique the law's inconsistent
treatment-that is, its selective criminalization-of patterned conduct. After the
breakup, ongoing conduct that significantly impinges on the victim's well-
being-by frightening, alarming, or harassing her-resembles the stranger
stalking paradigm, and it is prohibited. Before the breakup, ongoing conduct
that impinges on the victim's wellbeing in just these ways is ignored. Though
intricately connected to a regime of physical violence, nonphysical abuse is
tolerated, along with its harms. This hidden doctrinal puzzle raises important
questions about how we think about violence between intimates and the
adequacy of existing legal responses.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I draws from social science research
and case law in order to contest the standard mode of distinguishing between
domestic violence and stalking.7 The discussion challenges the hold that this
battering/stalking division maintains on our legal and popular imaginations.8
Part II examines separation and critiques its exalted status in criminal law.
Separation does not occur at a moment in time, nor is it typically the marker of
a transformed practice of intimate violence. Its legal standing as such demands
explanation of why a designated relationship exit on the part of the victim
becomes necessary for the law to recognize context that was there all along.
The de facto separation requirement, as I will call it, derives from an account of
consent to violence in intimate relationships.
Part III explores the theoretical underpinnings of consent and applies this
framework to the context of abuse. Tacit attributions of consent cannot be
reconciled with what we know about the struggles of women in violent
relationships. Missing from the conditions which give rise to imputed consent
5. This Article seeks to challenge social and legal conceptions of what constitutes the end of a
relationship, along with related constructs (e.g., staying/leaving, breaking up). Since the discussion
conveys the substance of this critique, I will discontinue the use of quotation marks around these terms.
6. For a description of the harm of nonphysical abuse, see infra notes 23-42 and accompanying text.
The following discussion queries why this harm is recognized after the breakup but not before. In short,
it observes that the law can redress a course of conduct that extends beyond the physical, but that it does
so selectively. Though my argument here does not rest on this premise, I contend that the criminal law
serves an expressive function that is promoted by accurately conceiving the nature and extent of injury
to victims of domestic violence. I have defended this claim elsewhere. See Deborah Tucrkheimer,
Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering: A Call to Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 959, 1015-19 (2004).
7. See infa Section III.A.
8. See infra Section III.C.
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are voluntariness 9 and intentionality.10 The absence of these preconditions
undermines the legal imputation of consent, effectively opposing law's
separation requirement.
The Article concludes by evaluating the disparate levels of protection the
law affords women across the phases of relationships, and by urging an end to
this criminalization gap.
I. BATTERING/STALKING
Most stalking cases involve women who are victimized by their intimates
or former intimates." Many women experience both domestic violence and
stalking in their relationships, and can hardly differentiate between the two.12
Control-violent control13-is central to both forms of abuse, regardless of
whether a relationship is ongoing, ending, or over.14
For purposes of this Part, unless otherwise noted, I will adhere to common
usages of the terms stalking and domestic violence, which the criminal law
perpetuates.' 5 This approach implicitly defines a victim's emphatic rejection of
the relationship as the triggering condition for the onset of stalking.'6 In the
discussion that follows, I make two claims: first, what is conventionally
understood as stalking often occurs pre-breakup (though we place this under
the rubric of domestic violence);' 7  and second, what is conventionally
understood as domestic violence often occurs post-breakup (though we label
this stalking).' 8 This raises the question of why breaking upl9 matters for
9. See infra note 282 and accompanying text.
10. See infa note 283 and accompanying text.
I 1. See TK Logan, Research on Partner Stalking: Putting the Pieces Together, NAT'L. INST. OF
JUSTICE 3 (2010), http://www.victimsofcrime.org/docs/Common%20Documents/Research%20on
%20Partner0/20Stalking%2OReport.pdf (citations omitted) ("Research shows that partner stalking is a
relatively common form of violence against women. Partner stalking is the largest category of stalking
cases."); Patricia Tjaden & Nancy Thoennes, Stalking in America: Findings from the National Violence
Against Women Survey, NAT'L. INST. OF JUSTICE 2 (1998), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/169592.pdf
(finding that nearly eighty percent of stalking victims are women, and sixty percent of female stalking
victims are stalked by an intimate or formerly intimate partner; the two are not distinguished). See also
infra note 49. Further reference to stalking in this Article is directed to cases involving intimates and
former intimates.
12. See infra notes 69-79 and accompanying text.
13. The term "violent control" emphasizes that the backdrop of physical violence shapes the
meaning of control. See infra text accompanying note 26; notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
14. 1 will show that this conceptualization oversimplifies the complexities of abusive relationships.
See infra Part lIl.A.
15. See infra Section II.C.
16. 1 will argue that this understanding is extremely problematic. See infra Section II.C.
17. See infra Section II.A.
18. See infra Section II.B.
19. Though the term "break up" is not typically applied to married couples, I am using it in a
general sense, to mean that one partner has conveyed that the relationship is over. This is not to deny the
many possible iterations of this basic definition. See, e.g., Benoit Denizet-Lewis, Teaching Kids How to
Break Up Nicely, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 3, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/07/magazine
purposes of defining intimate partner violence, and prompts a related inquiry
into whether it should.2'
A. Control in Ongoing Relationships
Domestic violence, also known as battering, intimate partner violence,
intimate partner abuse, or simply abuse,22 is a pattern of violent conduct
23
predicated on power and control. Psychologist Mary Ann Dutton has
explained:
Abusive behavior does not occur as a series of discrete events.
Although a set of discrete abusive incidents can typically be identified
within an abusive relationship, an understanding of the dynamic of
power and control within an intimate relationship goes beyond these
discrete incidents. To negate the impact of the time period between
discrete episodes of serious violence-a time period during which the
woman may never know when the next incident will occur, and may
continue to live with ongoing psychological abuse-is to fail to
recognize what some battered woman experience as a continuing "state
of siege." 24
This state of siege takes many forms, which have been thoroughly
documented by social scientists.25 Abusers control their victims using a wide
spectrum of behaviors; what these behaviors share in common is that all are
rooted in the explicit or implicit threat of physical violence.26 Women in violent
relationships often cite the nonphysical components of abuse-or, as I am
conceiving it, nonphysical violence 27-as the worst of what they endure.28
/teaching-kids-how-to-break-up-nicely.html (discussing how, in a "Breakups 101" workshop for
teenagers, the facilitator suggested that breakups involve "an agreement or mutual understanding").
20. See infra Section IL.C
21. See infra Part l1.
22. Each label has its merits and drawbacks; this Aniele uses them interchangeably.
23. "Law enforcement experts and victim advocates understand intimate partner violence as a
pattern of controlling behavior that one intimate partner directs at another." The Model Stalking Code
Revisited: Responding to the New Realities of'Stalking, NAT'L. CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME 14 (2007),
http://www.victimsofcrime.org/docs/src/model-stalking-code.pdf [hereinafter Model Stalking Code
Revisited].
24. Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women s Responses to Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of
Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191, 1208 (1993).
25. For one especially comprehensive account, see EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: How MEN
ENTRAP WOMEN IN PERSONAL LIFE (2007).
26. Id. at 205 (emphasizing that, in abusive relationships, the backdrop of physical violence shapes
the meaning of control).
27. I recognize that this is an unconventional formulation, owing to the stranger violence paradigm
that continues to dominate criminal law and influence social norms. See infra note 47 and accompanying
text. Even so, the definition of violence is hardly fixed; rather it is "contingent and contested." Alice
Ristroph, Criminal Law in the Shadow of Violence, 62 ALA. L. REV. 571, 602 (2011). In abusive
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Along with psychological abuse, sexual abuse, threats, economic coercion,
and isolation,29 batterers use stalking as a means of controlling their intimate
30
partners. Stalking of this kind most often begins during a relationship, as
opposed to at its end.
relationships, nonphysical violence typically works in tandem with physical violence; both foster a
constant state of vulnerability and enhance the batterer's power over the victim.
28. Empirical research on intimate partner violence consistently documents the devastating harm of
nonphysical abuse. See TK LOGAN ET AL., PARTNER STALKING: How WOMEN COPE, RESPOND, AND
SURVIVE 7, 107-47 (2006) (describing physical and mental health costs of partner stalking); Mindy B.
Mechanic et al., Mental Health Consequences of Intimate Partner Abuse: A Multidimensional
Assessment ofFour Different Forms ofAbuse, 14 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 634 (2008) (finding that
sexual coercion, psychological abuse and stalking contribute to adverse mental health consequences for
abused women, even apart from physical violence and injuries). It has become increasingly clear that the
anxiety and fear caused by the unpredictability of physical violence is its own form of injury to women.
See, e.g., LOGAN ET AL., supra, at 88-89 ("Melissa described how living with the constant threat of
violence and stalking pushed her, at times, to the desperate desire for it to be over, so much so that the
thought of suicide had entered her mind, 'You just want it over with period. And it's like you'll do
anything. When it comes down to it you just want things [to be] done."'); id. at 126 (recounting an
interview with a woman who was "scared never knowing what's gonna happen to me, never knowing
what's going on around me. [I was] being intimidated and threatened most of the time and isolated").
The "constant vigilance required to anticipate [the abusive] partner's reactions" exacts a painful toll. Id.
As one battered woman explained, "I had to, well, when I lived with him I had to try to figure out what
he was going to do the next day, I had to be a step ahead of him." Id. Given developing understandings
of the effects of abuse, it may be understating the point to note that "[clpisodic physical violence, while
often a devastating manifestation of the abuser's control, does not fully define its contours or map its
reaches." Tuerkheimer, supra note 6, at 966. See also infra note 42 and accompanying text.
29. See ELIZABETH SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 65 (2000). See
also STARK, supra note 25, at 130-32, 256-57.
30. The research literature lends abundant support to this proposition. As one leading study
summarized, "The stalking partners' control and dominance over women's thinking and actions
alienated them from their own goals, intentions, thoughts, feelings, and it isolated them from others."
LOGAN ET AL., supra note 28, at 135. Another researcher concluded, "The current study indicates that
stalking should also be seen as a variant of IPA [Intimate Partner Abuse] during the relationship.
Stalking may give the abuser greater control over his victim during the relationship and may be one of
the many tactics batterers use to ensure that women stay in abusive relationships." Heather Melton,
Stalking in the Context of Intimate Partner Abuse: In the Victim's Words, 2 FEMINIST CRIMINOLOGY
347, 361 (2007). For women's accounts of how their partner's stalking contributed to the overall scheme
of control, see LOGAN ET AL., supra note 28, at 135-141. For a number of powerful first-person accounts
of stalking during ongoing relationships, see id. at 17, 87-90. In an especially vivid illustration of the
centrality of control to intimate partner stalking, one woman kept expecting her husband to show up
during her interview for the stalking study. In her words, "I thought he would come around, because I
swear I saw his truck, I swear I did." Id. at 88. Researchers reported that this woman "spent much of the
interview looking out the window for his truck." Id. See also TK Logan & Robert Walker, Partner
Stalking: Psychological Dominance or "Business as Usual"?, 10 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE & ABUSE 247,
251 (2009).
31. In one study, seventy-nine percent of women reported that their partners begin stalking them
during the first two years of the relationship. LOGAN ET AL., supra note 28, at 38. Researchers concluded
that "one of the more important findings is the pervasiveness of stalking within the intimate relationship
as well as after the dissolution of the relationship." Id. at 57. See generally Melton, supra note 30
(finding that in the vast majority of examined cases, stalking began during the relationship, and
collecting accounts of such behavior). Despite this reality, most empirical studies only examine partner
stalking once the relationship has ended, and many women themselves do not define their partner's
behavior as stalking until these behaviors continue post-breakup. LOGAN ET AL., supra note 28, at 47.
See also Melton, supra note 30, at 355 ("I never considered it that [stalking] when we were together, but
I think it was constant. I just didn't see it as that at the time.").
An emerging body of social science research supports this understanding.32
One recent study found that "[s]talking tactics did not occur in isolation, but
rather co-occurred within the context of significant psychological, physical, and
sexual violence perpetrated by the stalking partner."33 Another study framed
stalking as "an extension of coercive control," and posed the question of
whether partner stalking is simply "business as usual" for abusers, rather than a
unique form of psychological dominance. 34 Yet another large study of intimate
partner stalking noted:
Topographical similarities between these three constructs include the
fact that battering, emotional abuse, and stalking tend to be serial and
ongoing and can occur during and after the termination of the romantic
relationship . . . . Functional similarities include findings that battering,
stalking and some aspects of emotional abuse appear to be motivated
by attempts to control and intimidate the victim .... .
In short, "stalking represents an extreme form of dominance and control
when it occurs in the context of physically violent relationships." 36
These conclusions are wholly consistent with first-person accounts of
violence in relationships. Women who experience abuse often perceive stalking
as integral to the overall pattern of conduct.37 When asked why she thought her
partner stalked her, one woman, Gloria, answered, "he wants total, complete
control over me. I know that."3 8 Vanessa, another woman abused by her partner
remarked, "I feel like a caged animal. I can't be my own person. I'm not
independent anymore. I can't be independent." 39
32. The legal definition of stalking, however, departs significantly from this account. See infra
Section II.B.
33. LOGAN ET AL., supra note 28, at 289.
34. Logan & Walker, supra note 30, at 253. As the researchers noted, "One of the critical
unanswered questions about partner stalking is when does partner stalking harassment or ongoing
psychological or other abuse become stalking? Put differently, what determines ongoing violent and
harassing behavior as stalking versus business as usual (or continuation of abuse)?" Id. Without
providing a definitive answer, the study rightly observed that, "at some level, this question goes to the
validity of the construct of stalking." Id.
35. Mindy B. Mechanic et al., Intimate Partner Violence and Stalking Behavior: Exploration of
Patterns and Correlates in a Sample ofAcutely Battered Women, 15 VIOLENCE VICTIMS 55, 68 (2000).
36. Id.
37. See LOGAN ET AL., supra note 28, at 289 ("[S]eparating psychological abuse, especially
monitoring and controlling aspects of psychological abuse, from stalking has proved to be particularly
difficult for women. . . . This may especially be the case for women being stalked while they are living
with or dating the stalking partner. In essence, a partner can monitor and control a woman through the
traditional methods of stalking, such as surveillance, harassment, and threats; but may be able to reduce
some of his behaviors (e.g., surveillance) once he has established a certain level of control over her.").
38. Id. at 183-84. See also id. at 49 (describing Gloria recounting that her partner's stalking "made
me feel like he was trying to control my life").
39. Id. at 135. Vanessa was stalked by her abuser, as are many women in the course of violent
relationships. See id. at 288 ("One significant feature underscored by this research was the pervasiveness
of stalking within the relationship as well as after the dissolution of the relationship.").
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Like other mechanisms of control, stalking operates against an ever-present
backdrop of physical violence. 40 And as with other nonphysical components of
the battering dynamic,41 stalking creates damage that is severe and lasting. As
one group of researchers explains, "Taken together, the experiences of stalking
and emotional abuse create a climate of unrelenting fear that haunts battered
women even after they separate from their abusive partners."4 2 But is the
stalking that occurs during ongoing relationships the same as the stalking that
occurs once these relationships have ended? To answer this question, it is
helpful to consider what constitutes stalking.
Let us consider two possible conceptualizations: one narrow,43 the other
broad.44 Under a narrow definition of stalking, unwanted pursuit-physical or
electronic45-iS the essence of the wrong.46 We might call this the stranger
stalking paradigm.47 On this view, the very notion of pursuit is set against a
default of geographic distance between perpetrator and victim. Only when this
presumption of distance is disrupted-i.e., when the desired space is
encroached upon-do we identify the undesired conduct as stalking. Although
40. For instance, Gloria's partner would routinely threaten her with knives and guns. Id. at 183-85.
For additional accounts of the physical violence backdrop, see id. at 79-82; Logan & Walker, supra note
30, at 248 (describing stalking as one of a "few crimes where the victim's safety is threatened over such
a long period of time"). According to researchers, "women who reported stalking also reported a more
severe history of psychological abuse, serious threats, and injury during the relationship compared to
women who did not report stalking. In addition, women who reported being stalked in the preceding
year also reported more threats to her life, more threats and attacks with weapons and being physically
and sexually assaulted more often in the year preceding the interview than women who did not report
stalking." LOGAN ET AL., supra note 28, at 7. Stalking in relationships is correlated with an increased
risk of lethality. See Judith M. McFarlane et al., Stalking and Intimate Partner Femicide, 3 HOMICIDE
STUDIES 300 (1999).
41. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
42. Mechanic et al., supra note 35, at 68. As another study characterized this harm, "the sense of
looming vulnerability that accompanies threats may be more productive of psychological distress in
stalking victims than the reality of actual physical assault." Troy McEwan ct al., Identifying Risk Factors
in Stalking: A Review of Current Research, INT. J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 1, 7 (2007). See also Melton, supra
note 30, at 353, 355, 359.
43. This conception is generally employed by social scientists without remark. For a notable
exception, see Logan & Walker, supra note 30, at 253.
44. Common to both understandings is the recognition that context matters for purposes of
evaluating the meaning and harm of a particular act. See LOGAN ET AL., supra note 28, at 289 ("The
context and history of relationships, especially violent relationships, greatly influence women's
interpretations and responses to partner stalking behaviors. Stalking tactics did not occur in isolation, but
rather co-occurred within the context of significant psychological, physical, and sexual violence
perpetrated by the stalking partner. The relationship history provides a context that often only the two
individuals with that history can understand."). For a summary of the broad conceptualization, see infra
notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
45. See Cynthia Southworth et al., Intimate Partner Violence, Technology, and Stalking, 13
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 842 (2007).
46. Empirical research on stalking seems largely to proceed on the basis of this definition. See infra
note 52.
47. To be clear, relationships that have ended more closely resemble the stranger stalking model
than do ongoing relationships. See infra notes 55-60 and accompanying text (discussing the significance
of geographic distance).
behaviors that fall within even this narrow conception of stalking can48 and
often do occur within ongoing relationships,49 the conduct goes unpunished,
and even unnoticed.so In other words, the narrow formulation of stalking is
unevenly applied. This shows how, in practice,5' relationship status obscures
criminality.
Apart from the problem of inconsistency, the stalking definition posited
above suffers from conceptual limitations. The narrow framing of stalking
simply overlooks too much. Effectively conditioning the definition of stalking
on pursuit,52 rather than control, discounts the possibility that much the same
harm is also accomplished in intimate relationships where space is all too
shared.
Conflating stalking with tracking behavior makes sense with respect to
strangers (and intimates whose ties have sufficiently unwound to allow for neat
analogy).54 But a conception of stalking premised on following 5 does not
adequately account for the domestic setting. In these cases, physical
48. When a domestic violence victim leaves the home-often for work or school-her abuser's
stalking involves pursuit, and thus more closely approximates the stranger paradigm (though the
backdrop of physical violence continues to distinguish the two). See infra notes 55-60 and
accompanying text (elaborating on pursuit and the significance of geographic distance between stalker
and victim).
49. Again, according to the NISVS, more than one third of women in the United States "have
experienced rape, physical violence, and/or stalking by an intimate partner in their lifetime." NISVS,
supra note 1, at 2. Among these women, approximately fourteen percent were both physically assaulted
and stalked, and over twelve percent experienced all three forms of intimate partner violence. Id. at 41.
50. See infra Section I.C.
51. See infra notes 128-129 and accompanying text.
52. For instance, the NISVS broadly defined stalking as a "pattern of harassing or threatening
tactics used by a perpetrator that is both unwanted and causes fear or safety concerns in the victim," but
then significantly (and, for reasons I am suggesting, unjustifiably) narrowed the measured range of
tactics in keeping with a stranger stalking paradigm. Apart from unwanted phone calls, text messages, e-
mails, gifts, and the like, the NISVS list of stalking behaviors was limited to: "watching or following
from a distance, spying with a listening device, camera, or global positioning system;" "approaching or
showing up in places such as the victim's home, workplace, or school when it was unwanted;" "leaving
strange or potentially threatening items of the victim to find;" and "sneaking into the victim's home or
car and doing things to scare the victim or let the victim know the perpetrator had been there." NISVS,
supra note 1, at 29.
53. A conceptual analysis of stalking's harm is largely undeveloped. The 1993 Model Anti-Stalking
Code did not include a legislative history section, and few states have included statements of intent or
history in their laws. Model Stalking Code Revisited, supra note 23, at 28. One unusually exhaustive
statement of purpose is found in Colorado's statute: "Because stalking involves highly inappropriate
intensity, persistence, and possessiveness, it entails great unpredictability and creates great stress and
fear for the victim. Stalking involves severe intrusions on the victim's personal privacy and autonomy,
with an immediate and long-lasting impact on quality of life as well as risks to security and safety of the
victim and persons close to the victim, even in the absence of express threats of physical harm." Colo.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-3-601(c)-(f) (2011). The Model Stalking Code includes a legislative intent section
that basically echoes this language. Model Stalking Code Revisited, supra note 23, at 24. Cf. State v.
Rucsch, 571 N.W.2d 898, 903 (Wis. App. 1997) ("[Stalking legislation] serves significant and
substantial state interests by providing law enforcement officials with a means of intervention in
potentially dangerous situations before actual violence occurs, and it enables citizens to protect
themselves from recurring intimidation, fear-provoking conduct and physical violence.").
54. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (identifying the stranger stalking paradigm).
55. Following may be achieved physically, electronically, or virtually (in cyberspace). See
Southworth et al., supra note 45.
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separation-a necessary condition for pursuit-is exceedingly hard to come by.
Close physical proximity tends to disqualify much of the abusive course of
conduct from designation as stalking. This is striking, since the absence of
physical separation only heightens the victim's vulnerability to patterns of
controlling behavior.5 6 As the accounts that follow make clear, shared living
quarters facilitate the abuser's dominance. As one woman, Linda, recounted:
I'd go to the bathroom and if I was in there, you know, just sitting
there was relief. [She thought], "Thank God, I'm alone." Just to go to
the bathroom-To me that was like going to Paris for some women.
And if I was in there two minutes longer than he thought I should be,
he would just come in there [and she motioned grabbing her hair,
showing how he would drag her out of the bathroom right off the
toilet]. And if I was just in there, he would say I was thinking-
"conspiring."57
And as two other women, Lauren and Alice, explained:
If I would get out of bed he had to know where I was going. If it was
to the bathroom, he would say, "I'll go with you ... 58
[]
He's with me everywhere I go. If I go to the bathroom, he's like, "what
are you doing in there? What's taking you that long for?" And if I go
in the bathroom because I just want to fix my hair, if I just want to be
left alone with the door shut, even though I hate to be closed in, I will
shut that door in the bathroom. And he'll be standing there the whole
time, "What are you doing in there? What are you doing?" 59
56. Consider this similar observation: "[Slcparating psychological abuse, especially monitoring and
controlling aspects of psychological abuse, from stalking has proved to be particularly difficult for
women. . . . This may especially be the case for women being stalked while they are living with or
dating the stalking partner. In essence, a partner can monitor and control a woman through the
traditional methods of stalking, such as surveillance, harassment, and threats; but may be able to reduce
some of his behaviors (e.g., surveillance) once he has established a certain level of control over her. For
example [one woman interviewed] . . . developed a social phobia during the course of their relationship
[as a result of the abuse], and reports that she rarely leaves her home now. Thus, her stalking partner
essentially does not have to work as hard to stalk her as perhaps he did when they first started dating."
LOGAN ET AL., supra note 28 at 289. See also discussion supra note 53 (describing the harms that result
from stalking within ongoing relationships).
57. LOGAN ET AL., supra note 28, at 32 (quoting interview with Linda).
58. Id. (quoting interview with Lauren).
59. Id. (quoting interview with Alice).
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If the prerequisite of geographic distance is abandoned, the stalking/abuse
divide collapses. Women who are stalked by their current and former intimates
emphasize that the stalking course of conduct is predicated not on physical
violence, and not on tracking, but on control.60  When stalking is
reconceptualized as the course of conduct in its entirety,61 it looks much like
domestic violence. 62
To summarize, violence in ongoing relationships is patterned, an
interconnected system of power and control. Batterers often stalk their victims,
though this conduct is far less often accurately identified. Stalking may be
understood in a narrow sense, as contingent on the victim's ability to find
physical space away from her batterer. Or stalking may be seen as a course of
conduct centered on controlling the victim through fear-in which case stalking
closely resembles the experience of domestic violence (as opposed to its legal
conception). Either way, stalking in continuing relationships is scarcely
observed, much less redressed, by law. 63
When relationships end, this changes. Now, we see stalking-and domestic
violence abruptly recedes into the past.
B. Control in Ruptured Relationships
Breakups precipitate diminished physical proximity between an abuser and
his victim. Confronting the prospects of shrinking shared space and his partner
exerting autonomy in new ways, a batterer often escalates his efforts to control
her.64 These tactics are readily classified as stalking. This in turn allows the
meaning of a particular act to be understood in the context of a relationship-
one that is in the midst of dissolving. Seemingly isolated conduct is now
understood as part of a unified effort to preserve a connection that has come
undone. In this respect, stalking is contextualized.
60. See infra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
61. As we will see, this proposition is consistent with the statutory definition of stalking that has
been adopted by a majority ofjurisdictions. See infra notes 105-120 and accompanying text.
62. To better observe this resemblance, consider the "key examples of behaviors the [Model
Stalking Code advisory board] felt should be covered under a model code." Model Stalking Code
Revisited, supra note 23, at 21. The list of stalking behaviors includes violating protection orders,
engaging in obsessive or controlling behaviors, targeting third parties to scare a victim, killing animals,
using cultural context (such as immigration-related threats) to scare a victim, using humiliating or
degrading tactics such as posting pictures of the victim on the Internet, forcing a victim to take time off
from work, and assaulting a victim. Id. Each of these behaviors is typical of domestic violence. See
supra Section l.A.
63. See infra Section II.A.
64. "When a victim leaves an abusive relationship, the risk of violence actually increases because
the victim has challenged the perpetrator's unilateral exercise of power and control. The perpetrator
often lashes out violently toward the victim in an attempt to retain or regain power and control." Model
Stalking Code Revisited, supra note 23, at 14. See also Logan & Walker, supra note 30, at 248; infra
note 264 (describing separation assault).
65. The recurrence of "not letting go" rhetoric is consistent with this orientation.
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But this story is incomplete. Preserving a relationship is not the stalker's
ultimate aim; the maintenance of ongoing control over his intimate is.66
Stalkers employ a range of mechanisms to defend the relational hierarchy when
domestic space is no longer available for this purpose.67 Some methods may be
different from what have come before, but many are just newly visible.68
The argument that stalking should be recast as a continuation of the course
of conduct that preceded the breakup finds ample support in the social science
literature. Women's accounts of post-separation stalking prominently feature
control.69 For instance, one victim explained the behavior of her ex-husband as
follows: "[H]e still has not completely let go of the control. He has, he's such a
controlling person you know, I mean . . . . But it's just, it's all control. All has
to do with control., 70
Another woman experienced post-separation stalking as follows:
You know, even though we separated and were going to get a divorce,
it was still, he could never work it out in his head about a control issue.
You can't control other people. And so this is their way of controlling
71
you. By making you afraid. It's the only control they have over you.
Years after their divorce, another woman's ex-husband was still
"sabotaging her social relationships and her job, breaking into her home,
threatening her, harassing her with false reports of child abuse," and surveilling
her.72 This woman, Diana, described her former husband as "a terrorist."73
Diana's story vividly depicts the connection between an abuser's control, a
victim's fear, and the continuing course of conduct that spanned her repeated
attempts to separate. 74 At the time of the interview, Diana explained that she
was so frightened of her ex-husband that she had for some time been spending
the night at her mother's apartment. She recounted:
66. See LOGAN ET AL., supra note 28, at 37 (describing stalking "as an extreme, sustained, and
systematic form of psychological abuse that crosses into the public spheres of a woman's life").
67. Cf Melton, supra note 30, at 354 ("[S]talking is a method abusers use to assert themselves into
their victims' lives, beyond the confines of their homes.").
68. One list of stalking tactics divides the behaviors into five categories: surveillance, harassing
behavior, threats, property destruction or invasion, and physical violence. LOGAN ET AL., supra note 28,
at 19. See also Mechanic et al., supra note 35, at 62 (listing the most commonly reported stalking
behaviors in order of occurrence).
69. See Melton, supra note 30, at 359 ("[C]ontrol was the number-one cited motivation for the
stalking").
70. Id. at 352.
71. Id.
72. LOGAN ET AL., supra note 28, at 14.
73. Id.
74. Diana had been divorced from her husband for two years at the time of the interview, though
her efforts to end the relationship even preceded the marriage, which lasted for twenty years. During this
period, Diana separated from her husband six times. Id. at 13-14. See infra Section Ill.A.
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But there have been nights that, like, I wake up and I know that my ex-
husband knows where her couch sits in the apartment. She has a
picture window there, and so I will actually be afraid to sleep on the
couch and I'll get down on the floor and sleep because I feel like he
might be out there. It affects you. You know, there are days you feel
like you're going crazy because you've always-you've got to keep it
on your mind all the time. You can't let your guard down. . . . I
couldn't sleep knowing he was in the same house with me and then I
ran him off and can't sleep because he's out lurking around. It's a lose-
lose situation.75
Women repeatedly report that stalking began prior to separation, 76 and that
the relationship while intact was "characterized by physical abuse and control,
physical assault, and sexual assault." 77 Further proving the singularly
controlling nature of the abusive course of conduct,78 research has shown that
"there may be a dose-response relationship between severity of the history of
violence and fear evoked from the stalking behavior." 79
As demonstrated by these accounts, what is often called stalking in cases of
former intimates may be more usefully framed as post-domestic violence.so
When post-breakup stalking is conceptually severed from stalking behaviors
that came before, this fuller description of the violence disappears. Similarly,
failing to situate stalking in the context of the pre-breakup relationship hides a
deeper explanation for the dynamics of post-separation abuse.
Overall, both the stalking in domestic violence and the domestic violence
in stalking remain largely hidden from social view. This is accomplished by
means of an artificial domestic violence/stalking divide. The next Part
considers the legal import of this divide, beginning a conversation about how '
and why82 breakups construct the crimes of stalking and domestic violence.
75. LOGAN ET AL., supra note 28, at 14. Diana concluded: "And I don't know how desperate he is.
It's like the more I keep him away from me, the more desperate he becomes with his actions. That's the
scary thing about it. You can't win with him. You can't win with a stalker." Id. at 14-15.
76. See supra notes 30-40 and accompanying text.
77. Logan & Walker, supra note 30, at 249.
78. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
79. Logan & Walker, supra note 30, at 249. In one study, "the severity of abuse during the
relationship was associated with greater the level of fear from stalking. Specifically, the more
psychological abuse tactics a woman experienced in the relationship, the greater her fear and concem
about future harm from the stalker." Id.
80. The more limited understanding of stalking, on the other hand, is reified by the criminal law.
See infra Section II.C.
81. See infa Part II.
82. See infra Part III.
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II. LAW'S RELATIONSHIP EXEMPTION
We turn now to the criminal law's treatment of patterned violence." This
Part describes two competing approaches to criminalization-one applied to
domestic violence, the other to stalking. We will see that domestic violence is
(wrongly) deemed episodic, comprised of isolated incidents of physical
84injury, while stalking is (rightly) perceived as continuing, constituted by a
85
pattern of behavior grounded in power and control. At some precise point in
time, domestic violence becomes stalking under the law, and the law's
construction of crime shifts dramatically. When does this instant occur? What
reveals the pattern, or underlying dynamic, of control that has existed all along?
And, perhaps most importantly, what accounts for this designation?
To answer these questions, we begin by examining the law's response to
domestic violence, which is characterized by a complete lack of recognition of
87 8ongoing conduct. We will then contrast this with the law of stalking, which
is fully grounded in an appreciation of context. We may then discern what leads
to a pattern-focused crime paradigm. The magic moment: separation. 89
A. Obscuring Patterns: The Case ofDomestic Violence
The criminal law's treatment of domestic violence has evolved in
important ways since the late nineteenth century, when corporal punishment, or
"chastisement," was a right. 90 During the Reconstruction era and the decades
following it, privacy-based rationales for nonintervention in domestic settings
saturated the criminal justice system at all levels.91 In more recent times, the
law's approach to intimate partner abuse has advanced, progressing from
83. 1 have in mind substantive criminal law in its formal statutory articulation as well as in its
implementation. See infra notes 128-131 and accompanying text.
84. See infra Section II.A.
85. See infra Section II.B.
86. This shift has evidentiary significance, as well. In particular, deep tensions arise where "prior
acts" evidence is offered in stalking prosecutions, since patterns occurring before the charged crimes
(i.e., the domestic violence) are not themselves considered criminal. See infra Part lI.C. Because the
onset of stalking is typically thought to occur at breakup, a defendant's abuse before separation is
generally excluded under the general prohibition on character evidence or admitted only for a limited
purpose. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b). For a more thorough discussion of the evidentiary issues arising
when abuse is framed as history, see Tuerkheimer, supra note 6, at 989-98.
87. See infra Section II.A.
88. See infra Section II.B.
89. See infra Section II.C. I challenge the notion of a singular moment of separation, see infra
Section IlIl.A, but I adopt it for the present purpose of describing the criminal law's response.
90. See Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE
L. J. 2117, 2129 (1996).
91. Id. at 2150-74. For a different historical perspective, see generally Carolyn B. Ramsey, Intimate
Homicide: Gender and Crime Control, 1880-1920, 77 U. COLO. L. REv. 101 (2006).
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chastisement as a right to the prosecution of domestic violence.92 But this
progress has stalled.
The laws used to prosecute domestic violence-including assault, burglary,
property destruction, violation of a restraining order, kidnapping, homicide,
rape, and sexual assault-do not describe its essence. Even where state
legislation seems to target the crime directly, it does so in name only: so-called
"domestic violence statutes" are in essence "assault-plus-relationships" laws,
which simply replicate the inadequacies of already existing approaches.9 3 On
closer examination, it is apparent that the laws purporting to reach the crime of
battering leave untouched the patterns of power and control that we have been
discussing.9 4
There are two reasons for this failure. Criminal law is generally
characterized by, first, a narrow temporal lens and, second, a limited
conception of harm. Time and injury operate in tandem to obscure central
features of battering.
1. The Problem of Time
Statutes criminalizing violence do not account for the perpetration of
continuing acts. The traditional common law conception of crime as occurring
at a discrete moment still endures.95 While there are exceptions 96-most
importantly for our purposes, in stalking statutes97  transactional crime
remains the norm. The incident-focused criminal law still contemplates an act
that transpires at an ascertainable instant, meaning that, in theory, one can
capture the commission of an archetypical crime in a photograph.
This model of crime fails utterly to describe domestic violence. A
constricted temporal frame removes from criminal law's ambit ongoing abuse
that can only be understood in its totality. Since this conduct cannot be reduced
to a slice of time, it lies outside of the law's scope.
2. The Problem ofInjury
The incident-bound nature of criminal law is compounded by an overly
narrow conception of harm as physical injury or the imminent threat of it.
92. For an overview, see Tuerkheimer, supra note 6, at 970-71.
93. See infla notes 94-100 and accompanying text (detailing these limitations).
94. See supra Section L.A.
95. Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts III & IV, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
920, 932-33 (1987).
96. For instance, state statutes defining harassment, menacing, and course of sexual conduct against
a child all criminalize a course of conduct. In the federal system, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), Organized Crime and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2012)), is a primary example of nontransactional crime. See
Lynch, supra note 95, at 952-53.
97. See infra notes 104-118 and accompanying text.
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Nonphysical manifestations of power and control that define the abusive
relationship-and, as we have seen, do real harm to its victims,98 are not
recognized by the criminal law. By using physicality alone to ascribe meaning,
the law disregards the space between episodes of physical violence. The effect
of isolating and atomizing violence in intimate relationships is to render
meaningless its context: the backdrop of pervasive control against which
physical episodes occur, in other words, the relationship itself.
The continuing relationship between batterer and victim is the terrain on
which a system of domination is enacted. This relationship connects and
organizes what might otherwise appear to be random acts, and it is essential to
grasping the full measure of resulting injury. 99 Nonetheless, the crime of
domestic violence does not contemplate that the relationship might be integral
to an abuser's entire course of conduct.1oo The crime thus accomplishes a
massive legal erasure of what it ostensibly targets.
B. Criminalizing Patterns: The Case ofStalking
The law of stalking represents an important move toward criminalizing
context.'0 Unlike domestic violence laws, stalking statutes encompass ongoing
conduct.102 For instance, one model statute reads as follows:
Any person who purposefully engages in a course of conduct directed
at a specific person and knows or should know that the course of
conduct would cause a reasonable person to: (a) fear for his or her
safety or the safety of a third person; or (b) suffer other emotional
distress is guilty of stalking. 0 3
98. See supra notes 30-40 and accompanying text.
99. See Sarah M. Bucl, Putting Forfeiture to Work, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1295, 1341 (2010)
("The cumulative harm of this multifaceted abuse can result in the victim exhibiting low self-esteem,
guilt, shame, anger, sadness, unrealistic hope, denial, self-blame, and, especially, fear.").
100. I have previously proposed a model statute that would do so. See Appendix: Model Domestic
Violence Statute. For a discussion of this statute, see infra note 134 and accompanying text.
101. For an overview of the development of stalking legislation nationwide, see Domestic Violence,
Stalking, and Antistalking Legislation: An Annual Report to Congress under the Violence Against
Women Act, NAT'L. INST. OF JUSTICE (1996), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilcs/stlkbook.pdf [hereinafter
NIJ Report].
102. See infra notes 106-110 and accompanying text.
103. Model Stalking Code Revisited, supra note 23, at 24. This statutory language was proposed by
the National Center for Victims of Crime in its 2007 report evaluating the 1993 Model Anti-Stalking
Code. Id. at 9-10. The older model, which was developed by the National Institute of Justice, "served as
an excellent template for its time," and "[m]any states incorporated provisions of the original model
code when drafting or expanding their state stalking statutes, and some courts referred to the model law
when interpreting provisions in state stalking laws." Id. at 12. In relevant part, the 1993 Model Anti-
Stalking Code provides as follows: "Section 1. For purposes of this code: (a) 'Course of conduct' means
repeatedly maintaining a visual or physical proximity to a person or repeatedly conveying verbal or
written threats or threats implied by conduct or a combination thereof directed at or toward a person;
(b) 'Repeatedly' means on two or more occasions; and
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By codifying the insight that seemingly isolated events are properly viewed
as a whole, anti-stalking legislation accounts for abusive patterns of behavior.
As one example, the District of Columbia Code's section on legislative intent
explicitly states that "stalking includes a pattern of following or monitoring the
victim, or committing violent or intimidating acts against the victim, regardless
of the means."' 04
Though state stalking statutes vary, 05 they generally share two key
features. First, the crime is understood as occurring over time. o0 Most states
specifically require that a person engage in a "course of conduct."o 7 This term
(c) 'Immediate family' means a spouse, parent, child, sibling, or any other person who regularly resides
in the household or who within the prior six months regularly resided in the household.
Section 2. Any person who:
(a) purposefully engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a
reasonable person to fear bodily injury to himself or herself or a member of his or her immediate family
or to fear the death of himself or herself or a member of his or her immediate family; and
(b) has knowledge or should have knowledge that the specific person will be placed in reasonable fear of
bodily injury to himself or herself or a member of his or her immediate family or will be placed in
reasonable fear of the death of himself or herself or a member of his or her immediate family; and
(c) whose acts induce fear in the specific person of bodily injury to himself or herscif or a member of his
or her immediate family or induce fear in the specific person of the death of himself or herself or a
member of his or her immediate family; is guilty of stalking." NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, MODEL ANTI-
STALKING CODE FOR THE STATES §§ 1-2 (1993). The remainder of this discussion focuses on state
stalking statutes, rather than on either model.
104. D.C. CODE § 22-3131 (2001); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-277.3A (West 2011)
(same, but including "observing"). See inifra notes 108-110 and accompanying text (describing "pattern
of behavior" statutes and relevant definitions).
105. The most important variables are whether a threat is required (and if so, whether it must be
explicit or implicit), whether intent to cause fear is required, and whether fear (actual or reasonable) or
alarm/annoyance on the part of the victim is required. See NIJ Report, supra note 101, app. E at E-2 to
E-5 (summarizing state statutes).
106. This is typically accomplished by requiring a "course of conduct." See infra note 107. In a
minority of jurisdictions, the term "repeatedly" is instead used to modify the prohibited behavior (e.g.,
following, harassing, making credible threats). See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-90(a) (2011); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 646.9(a) (West 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-602(l)(a) (West 2011); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:40.2(A) (2012); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.749(2) (West 2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 1173(A) (West 2012); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.732(1)(a) (West 2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-
19A-1(1) (2011); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 9A.46.110(l)(a) (West 2012); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-
9a(a) (West 2011).
107. Most states use this specific language in their statutory definitions. See ALASKA STAT. ANN.
§ 11.41.270(a) (West 2011); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-229(a)(1) (West 2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 1312(a) (2012); D.C. CODE § 22-3133(a) (2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048(1)(a) (West 2012);
HAw. REV. STAT. § 711-1106.5(1) (2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7906(l)(a) (2011); 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/12-7.3(a) (West 2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-10-1(1) (West 2011); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 708.11(2)(a) (West 2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5427(a)(1) (West 2011); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 508.130(1)(a) (West 2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 210-A(l)(A) (2011); MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIM. LAW, § 3-802(a) (West 2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 43(a)(1) (West 2011); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.411 h(l)(d) (West 2011); MiSS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-107(1)(a) (West 2011);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.225(2) (West 2012); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-311.02(2) (2011); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 200.575(l) (West 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 633:3-a(l)(a) (2012); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:12-10(b) (West 2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-3A-3(A) (West 2011); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.45,
50(3), 55(4) (McKinney 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-277.3A(c) (West 2011); N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. § 12.I-17-07.1(1)(c) (West 2012); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2709.1(a)(1) (West 2012); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-3-1700(C) (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-315(a)(4) (West 2011); TEX. PENAL
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"contemplates a pattern of conduct comprised of a series of acts over a period
of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose." 08 "Continuity of
purpose" language, also referred to as a "scheme,"1 09 spotlights the connections
between episodes. This gives the space "between" incidents the attention it
merits, effectively solving the problem of time that plagues the criminal law's
approach to domestic violence.110
Second, with respect to the problem of injury,' stalking statutes also
transcend the limitations of the traditional crime archetype. Rather than using
physical injury or the imminent threat of it as a proxy for harm, the law of
stalking adopts a more expansive view-one that, albeit imperfectly (because
mention of control itself is missing), better reflects the nature of the injury to
victims. Fear becomes one measure of harm: fear of death or physical injury to
oneself or a family member,"l 2 or for safety.113 This alone represents a
significant departure from the transactional crime archetype, since the statutory
framework contemplates that a victim's fear derives from the stalker's course
of conduct in its entirety, as opposed to any one incident.114
Most jurisdictions define victims' injuries as encompassing far more than
fear of physical harm. For instance, stalking occurs when a course of conduct
would cause a reasonable person to suffer "significant mental anguish or
distress that may, but does not necessarily, require medical or other
CODE ANN. § 42.072(a) (West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-106.5(2) (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13, § 1061(1) (West 2011); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.32(2)(a)-(b) (West 2011).
108. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-92(a) (2011); CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(f) (West 2012); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 784.048(1)(b) (West 2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5427(f)(1) (West 2011); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 508.130(2) (West 2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.2(C)(2) (2011); MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIM. LAW § 3-801 (West 2011); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 750.411 h(1)(a) (West 2011); MIsS. CODE
ANN. § 97-3-107(8)(a) (West 2011); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.225(1) (West 2012); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-
311.02(2)(b) (2011); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.575(6)(a) (West 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 633:3-a(ll)(a) (2012); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-17-07.1(1)(a) (West 2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § l173(F)(2) (West 2012); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2709.1(f) (West 2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 11-59-1(1) (2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1700(D) (2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-19A-5
(2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-315(a)(1) (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1061(2) (West
2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.32(1)(a) (West 2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-506(a)(i) (West 2011).
109. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.072(a) (West 2011).
110. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 98-100.
112. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-92(b) (2011); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.41.270(a) (West 2011);
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-71-229(a)(1), 5-71-229(b)(1) (West 2011); CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(a) (West
2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-181d(a), 53a-181c (West 2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-90(a)(1)
(West 2011); IOWA CODE ANN. § 708.11(2)(a)-(c) (West 2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5427(a)(1)-(3)
(West 2011); MisS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-107(l)(a) (West 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 633:3-a(I)(a)-
(b) (2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-3A-3(A) (West 2012) (including a reasonable apprehension of sexual
assault); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-19A-l(2) (2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1061(1)(B) (West 2011);
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-60.3(A) (West 2011).
113. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2923(A)(1) (2011); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-
7.3(a)(1) (West 2012).
114. See supra notes 105-109 and accompanying text on the importance of contextualizing
conduct.
[Vol. 25:168
professional treatment or counseling"; or when the course of conduct would
cause a person to "feel seriously alarmed, disturbed, or frightened; or suffer
emotional distress";' 16 or when the conduct would cause "substantial emotional
distress. . . . and serve[] no legitimate purpose." 1 In some jurisdictions, no
requisite showing of harm whatsoever is included in the statute; the defendant's
conduct may itself establish a crime.'ts
These definitions all depart from a physical-injury-based understanding of
harm.119 In this respect, as in its rejection of incident-bound description, the
crime of stalking approximates stalking as it exists outside the law. The
statutory language captures the relevance of the relationship, along with the
patterns of control embedded in it.' 20
The law of stalking thus represents what might be called a contextual
approach to crime. When compared to the law of domestic violence and its
115. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1312(a)(2) (2012). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-
277.3A(b)(4), 277.3A(c) (West 2011) (using "suffering" rather than "anguish"); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39-17-315(a)(2) (West 2011) (same). For similar provisions, see COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-
602(l)(c) (West 2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.2(A) (2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-10(a)(3),
(b) (West 2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2903.21 1(A)(1), 2903.21 1(D)(2) (West 2012); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 2709.1(a)(1)-(2) (West 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-1700(A), 16-3-1700(B) (2011);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-106.5(1)(d), 76-5-106.5(2) (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 1061(1)(B) (West 2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-9a(a) (West 2011); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 940.32(2)(a)-(c) (West 2011); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-506(a)(ii) (West 2011).
116. D.C. CODE § 22-3133(a)(1)(B)-(C) (2012). See also IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7906(1)(a) (West
2011) ("seriously alarms, annoys or harasses the victim and is such as would cause a reasonable person
substantial emotional distress"); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-10-1(1) (West 2011) ("terrorized, frightened,
intimidated, or threatened"); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508.130(1)(a)(2) (West 2011) ("alarms, annoys,
intimates, or harasses"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 210-A(l)(A)(1), 210-A(4), 210-A(5) (2011)
("serious inconvenience or emotional distress," "damage or destruction to or tampering with property,"
and fear of "injury to or the death of an animal"); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265 § 43(a)(1) (West
2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.41 lh(l)(d) (West 2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.749(1) (West
2012) ("frightened, threatened, oppressed, persecuted, or intimidated"); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.225(3)
(West 2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-220(1) (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-311.02 (2011)
("terrified"); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.575(l) (West 2011); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.45(A)(3)
(McKinney 2012) (reasonable fear that one's employment, business, or career is threatened, and the
actor was previously clearly informed to cease that conduct); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-17-
07.1(1)(c) (West 2012) ("fear, intimidation, or harassment"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1l73(A)(2)
(West 2012) ("terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested"). Oregon includes
"alarms or coerces," OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.732(1)(a) (West 2011), and further defines these terms
as "to cause apprehension or fear resulting from the perception of danger" and "to restrain compel or
dominate by force of threat," respectively, id. at § 163.730(1), (2).
117. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048(1)(a) (West 2012).
118. In Hawaii, "a person commits the offense of harassment by stalking if, with intent to harass,
annoy, or alarm another person, or in reckless disregard of the risk thereof, that person engages in a
course of conduct involving pursuit, surveillance, or nonconsensual contact upon the other person on
more than one occasion without legitimate purpose." HAW. REV. STAT. § 711-1106.5(1) (West 2011).
The "no legitimate purpose" clause is found in a number of other stalking statutes. See, e.g., FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 784.048(l)(a) (West 2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508.130(1)(a)(3) (West 2011); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-17-07.1(1)(c) (West 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1700(A)-(B) (2011); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-17-315(a)(3) (West 2011) ("Harassment does not include constitutionally protected activity
or conduct that serves a legitimate purpose."). Apart from immunizing the legislation against
constitutional challenge, this language serves to emphasize that context matters in assessing meaning.
119. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
120. See supra Section I.B.
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constricted view of abuse,121 it is striking that this approach corresponds
reasonably well with epistemological realities. The law can criminalize a
course of conduct, and it can move beyond physical injury, but it does so
selectively.122 Domestic violence is not subject to contextual treatment, but
stalking is. Given their functional similarity,123 this demands explanation.
The next section asks what transforms battering into stalking, thereby
recalibrating law's response. 124 Before turning to this inquiry, it is worth
observing the curious underutilization of stalking laws. While the language of
stalking statutes describes ongoing patterns of a nonphysical sort,125 these
statutes are not generally used to prosecute domestic violence of a nonphysical
sort.126 This is somewhat puzzling, since, apart from their name, stalking
statutes seem a far better fit for domestic violence than do statutes aimed at
domestic violence.127 Stalking laws criminalize a course of conduct, target
patterns, and address a broad range of harm. In these important respects,
stalking legislation more fully describes domestic violence than any other
statute enacted to date.
Prosecutors in at least one jurisdiction have applied stalking statutes to
reach domestic violence.128 The advantage of doing so is clear: when a
defendant is charged with stalking, his entire range of coercive behavior is not
only relevant to the crime charged; it is the crime charged. As a fuller picture
comes into focus, otherwise disregarded injury is recognized. Punishment can
at last be commensurate with the (real) crime.
A relationship-neutral stance toward the implementation of stalking
legislation can go some way toward redressing previously concealed patterns of
abuse. More specifically, I am contemplating a prosecutorial commitment to
using the course of conduct language found in stalking statutes wherever it is
121. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text (discussing competing transactional
approaches).
122. See infra Scction lI.C.
123. To be clear, the control that a battercr exercises during an ongoing relationship is akin to the
control exerted by the stalker once the relationship is deemed over. It is violent control, or "coercive
control," see Stark, supra note 25, and it is far different from the influence that intimate partners have
over one another in nonviolent relationships. See supra note 13. The separation requirement thus cannot
be defended as a means of locating the boundary between legitimate control and illegitimate control;
violent control is the same, regardless of relationship status. (Unless, of course, relationship is a signifier
of consent-a possibility I take up shortly.)
124. See Section II.C.
125. See supra notes I1- 119 and accompanying text.
126. It bears emphasizing that the nonphysical patterns at issue are rooted in a context of physical
violence. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
127. See supra Section lI.A.
128. As an Assistant District Attorney in New York County, I prosecuted domestic violence cases
and trained junior assistants to do so. During my five years in the office, domestic violence prosecutors
regularly applied New York's stalking statute to domestic violence in the manner I am outlining here. I
left the office in 2001, and do not know if this practice has continued. Whether other District Attorneys'
offices are generally using stalking laws to prosecute domestic violence remains to be seen, though I
find no indication of this in case law or other public records.
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applicable, within or outside relationships-that is, to charging conduct that fits
the statute's technical definition irrespective of whether the behavioral pattern
at issue falls within conventional (pursuit-based) understandings of stalking.
Regardless of whether a course of conduct precedes, follows, or spans the
demise of a relationship, if it satisfies the definition of stalking, it is criminal.
But this type of prosecutorial charging is exceedingly uncommon. In
practice, the use of stalking laws has been almost wholly confined to post-
breakup conduct readily perceived as stalking.129 The law of stalking thus is
governed on the ground not by the formal statutory regime, but by the bounds
of conventional social understandings. Since the application of a criminal
statute is dictated by the decisions of prosecutors, judges, and ultimately juries,
it comes as no surprise that the technical language of stalking legislation is
being implemented in ways that comport with widespread beliefs about
stalking.130
Although this unduly crabbed interpretation is not normatively defensible,
as I will explain,' 3' it is important to emphasize that the use of stalking statutes
to prosecute domestic violence is an imperfect solution to the problems I am
identifying. This is because, as I have previously observed, "What the law
defines as domestic violence (and what the law denies is domestic violence) is
generative of extra-legal meaning."l32 By way of elaboration:
Failure to outlaw the pattern of violence and power that is experienced
by battered women distorts communal understandings of the abuse that
is inflicted in intimate relationships. We do not see battering for what
it truly is. We do not see ourselves as victims or perpetrators of it. We
cannot grapple honestly with its root causes or our own societal
complicity in its perpetuation. Circumscribed by a collective
narrowness of understanding, any social condemnation of domestic
violence is, at best, misdirected to a practice that exists only in the
129. See J. Leslic Kurt, Stalking as a Variant of Domestic Violence, BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 219, 221 (1995) ("Common wisdom suggests that stalking behavior is generally
employed following a separation or the dissolution of a relationship."); LOGAN ET AL., supra note 28, at
288 ("[M]ost people tend to define stalking as something that occurs at the end of the intimate
relationships . . . ."). See supra note 46 (describing the dominant approach to the definitional question).
130. Cif David T. Johnson, The Organization of Prosecution and the Possibility of Order, 32 LAW
& Soc'Y REV. 247, 294 (1998) (noting that a major "source of uncertainty in the construction of crimes
is the fact that no one person makes the charge decision. In the United States the charge decision is
usually the prosecutor's ultimate responsibility, but that decision is 'shared' with more people than one
might suppose: complaining victims and citizens, patrol officers who respond to complaints, detectives
who investigate and gather evidence, witnesses, judges who conduct preliminary hearings, grand juries
who decide whether or not to indict, and defendants who choose whether or not to end the case with a
plea or a trial."). See infra note 271.
131. SeeinfaPartl1.
132. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 6, at 1018.
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landscape of law. Worse, what the law quietly calls legal becomes, or
remains, socially legitimate.' 33
There is a better way. I have proposed a model statute that would
separately criminalize domestic violence in a manner that captures its nature
and its harms.134 To do this, the same course-of-conduct language upon which
stalking laws are premised can readily be adapted to the particularities of
battering. In other words, there is strong precedent for the type of statute I am
envisioning.
But for now, the law emphatically distinguishes between domestic violence
and stalking; the former is framed as episodic and the latter as ongoing; and
stalking (but not domestic violence) causes nonphysical harm. In sum, it
matters a great deal when domestic violence becomes stalking. We now turn to
the shift in criminalization paradigms and what brings it about.
C. The De Facto Separation Requirement
In ongoing relationships, the law prohibits only physical violence. 35
Nonphysical abuse,136 though integral to the ongoing exercise of violent
control, is disregarded, and thus tacitly condoned.' 37 Just as patterned conduct
is overlooked, so, too, is the injury that results. Put simply, the criminal law
does not conceive of many women in abusive relationships as victims of
ongoing abuse.
When relationships end,139 however, patterns of abuse suddenly become
salient. Though the violent exercise of power and control occurs in virtually
seamless fashion throughout the stages of relationship, women must leave in
order for criminal law to take note. In functional terms, what this means is that
that prosecutors, perhaps anticipating the reaction of jurors to more imaginative
charging decisions, charge defendants with stalking for exclusively post-
separation conduct, despite the technical applicability of stalking laws to
domestic violence. And it means that appeals courts opine in these cases
without seeming to notice the artificiality of the stalking/domestic violence
133. Id. at 1019.
134. For the full model statute, see Appendix. For an explanation of its statutory provisions, see
Tuerkheimer, supra note 6, at 1019-23. See also Deborah Tucrkheimer, Renewing the Call to
Criminalize Domestic Violence: An Assessment Three Years Later, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 613, 613-14
(2007).
135. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 27 (on nonphysical violence).
137. See supra Section II.A.
138. See supra notes 30-40 and accompanying text.
139. For sake of readability, I will not use the terminology of "perceived ending," even though, in
the present context, this is the meaning of "end" that I intend. See infra Section lIl.A.
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divide.140 What marks this divide is a woman's leaving of the relationship,
which activates a newfound systemic receptivity to ongoing conduct, to
nonphysical injury, and to context.
I will call this law's de facto separation requirement. This requirement is
satisfied by a woman's leaving the relationship, which can take any number of
forms, including breaking up,141 obtaining an order of protection,142 and
dissolving a marriage by separation or divorce.143 At times, these mechanisms
of departure are afforded equal status. Other times, women seem obligated to
take formal legal action to sever their ties. All this is without judicial
discussion.
As the intimate partner stalking cases show,144 separation divulges context.
Prior to it, abuse is relegated to "history,"' 45 seen (if at all) as mere prelude to
the crime of stalking. Only when a woman leaves the abuser does injury that
results from ongoing conduct become law's concern.146 In other words,
separation is the necessary condition for victimization. Even more precisely,
separation is the necessary condition for victimization by a violent course of
conduct predicated on power and control - to wit, domestic violence, at least as
140. In other words, the assumptions that underlie the de facto separation requirement saturate all
levels of criminal justice, resulting in a criminal law that embeds the very same assumptions. See supra
notes 128-129 and accompanying text (describing undcrutilization of stalking laws and positing
explanation for same).
141. See, e.g., People v. Woolever, Jr., 2008 Cal. App. LEXIS 2907 (in which a defendant, who
committed repeated acts of violence against his girlfriend, was charged with stalking based on violence
that occurred only after she broke up with him); People v. Weisman, 2002 Cal. App. LEXIS 3916 (in
which a defendant, who committed repeated acts of violence against his girlfriend during the course of a
"1rocky" five year relationship, was charged with stalking based on conduct that occurred only after she
broke up with him); People v. Ledesma, 2002 Cal. App. LEXIS 360 (in which a defendant, who
committed repeated acts of physical and sexual violence against his girlfriend, was charged with stalking
based on conduct that occurred only after she broke up with him). It should be noted that the California
evidence code is unusually receptive to the admission of prior acts of domestic violence. CAL. EvID.
CODE § 1109 (West 2003-04) (generally allowing evidence of defendant's "commission of other
domestic violence" in prosecution for an offense involving domestic violence, subject to balancing of
probative value against prejudicial effect). In contrast, the rules in most jurisdictions make it more
difficult to discern a history of abuse from case law. See supra note 86.
142. See, e.g., People v. Ogle, 185 Cal. App. 4th 1138 (2010) (in which a defendant, who
committed repeated acts of violence against his wife, was charged with stalking based on conduct that
occurred only after she obtained a protection order); People v. Webb, 2009 Mich. App. LEXIS 2541 (in
which a defendant, who committed repeated acts of violence against his girlfriend, was charged with
stalking based on conduct that occurred only after she obtained a protection order); People v. Ramonez,
2003 Mich. App. LEXIS 1561 (in which, despite a "history of domestic violence," the defendant was
charged with stalking based on conduct that occurred only after his girlfriend obtained a protection
order). See also in/ia notes 149-185 and accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., People v. Duran, 2009 Cal. App. LEXIS 6440 (in which a defendant, who committed
repeated acts of violence against his wife, was charged with stalking based on conduct that occurred
only after she separated from him); People v. McCray, 58 Cal. App. 4th 159 (1997) (same). See also
in/ioa notes 187-212 and accompanying text.
144. See in/a notes 149-243 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 86.
146. As this Article shows, the criminal law (along with the rules of evidence) effectively hides the
nonphysical aspects of battering. As a result, descriptions of the violent course of conduct can be barely
glimpsed in the fissures of appellate decisions.
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it exists outside the bounds of criminal law. It should also be noted that even
incident-based violence, which accords with traditional paradigms, often goes
unaddressed, as illustrated by the accounts that follow. 147
What follows are four case studies in the selective criminalization of
patterned behavior. In each instance, ongoing abuse that occurred before
separation is deemed lawful (i.e., not criminal). Pre-breakup conduct matters
only insofar as it is thought to bear on the stalking. As is typical of the case
law, we will see that the stalking behavior involved represents a continuation of
the course of conduct that characterized the intact relationship. Yet stalking is
prosecuted as if it began upon the victim's departure.148 On analysis, these
cases demonstrate the de facto separation requirement in action.
1. State v. Vigil'
Sara met and began dating Christopher, the defendant, when she was
fifteen and he was twenty or twenty-one.150
When she turned eighteen, she moved into an apartment with him and
shortly thereafter, she became pregnant. From the beginning of their
relationship, the defendant verbally abused her, and later in the
relationship, he also physically abused her.[i 1] After their son was
born, her relationship with the defendant was "horrible." The
defendant continued his physical abuse, which resulted in her receiving
several injuries. . . . She ultimately left the defendant because she knew
that he was going to hurt their son and kill her.152
This abuse falls under the rubric of domestic violence; it occurred pre-
breakup, and is accordingly framed as only a preamble to the course of conduct
said to begin when Sara sought an order of protection against Christopher. 53
Over the next year, Christopher came to Sara's house numerous times, at
least once with a gun;154 he beat on her windows and doors;155 he followed her
147. See infra text accompanying note 275 (suggesting that the theory of imputed consent may also
help to explain the underenforcement of existing laws in cases of intimate relationships).
148. A note on methodology: in order to identify the legal onset of stalking in these cases, I relied
on judicial references to indictment dates and/or discussions of "prior acts" evidentiary rulings.
149. 65 S.W.3d 26 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001).
150. Id. at 28.
151. One police officer testified that he "routinely drove by the victims' house" and was
"concerned for [her] welfare." Id. This officer had responded to Sara's house at least ten times regarding
domestic disputes with the defendant. Id. Once, Christopher kicked down the door after Sara had locked
herself in; this was the only time that Christopher was arrested prior to the couple's breakup. Id.
152. Id. at 28-29.
153. Id. at 29.
154. Id. at 30.
155. Id. at 29.
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to the supermarket and attempted to take their son from her; 56 he drove to the
parking lot of the college administration building in which Sara was meeting
with her financial aid advisor;' 57 he mailed her a letter. 58 Based on this
conduct, Christopher was convicted of stalking.159
The case shows how the law selectively criminalizes a controlling pattern
of behavior.160 Christopher's ongoing violence was unlawful to the extent it
occurred subsequent to Sara's departure. All that antedated her leaving does not
register.
2. People v. Zavalal61
Mario and Alicia Zavala were married in 1989.162 Three years later, after
"a domestic violence incident" prompted Alicia to obtain a protection order
against Mario, the two were separated and divorced. They had one child in
164common.
Mario and Alicia "subsequently reconciled and they resumed living
together without remarrying, and had a second child together."' 65 The "history"
of violencel66 (the domestic violence) began in 2002, and ended (became
stalking) on June 20, 2003, when Alicia obtained a protection order requiring
Mario to leave the home.167
In one pre-breakup incident, Mario threw a plate at Alicia and called her a
"stupid bitch" while grabbing her with sufficient force to rip her shirt, bruise
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. By situating this act in the context of the entire abusive pattern, the court was able to
accurately observe that "[w]hile this letter is not threatening on its face, the defendant's mere contact
with the victim through this letter, regardless of its substance, may be sufficient to establish harassment
as defined by the stalking statute, given the history between the parties." Id. at 35.
159. The relevant statute, as cited in the opinion, reads as follows: "A person commits the offense
of stalking who intentionally and repeatedly follows or harasses another person in such a manner as
would cause that person to be in reasonable fear of being assaulted, suffering bodily injury or death."
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-315(a)(1). Further, "(A) 'Follows' means maintaining a visual or physical
proximity over a period of time to a specific person in such a manner as would cause a reasonable
person to have a fear of an assault, bodily injury or death;
(B) 'Harasses' means a course of conduct directed at a specific person which would cause a reasonable
person to fear an assault, bodily injury, or death, including, but not limited to, verbal threats, written
threats, vandalism, or unconsented-to physical contact; and
(C) 'Repeatedly' means on two (2) or more separate occasions. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-
315(a)(2)(A)-(C). Vigil, 65 S.W.3d at 32.
160. As the court noted, "The statute which defines stalking as a criminal offense contemplates a
series of discrete actions amounting to a continuing course of conduct." Vigil, 65 S.W.3d at 35 (citing
State v. Moxic, 963 S.W.2d 737, 743 (Tenn. 1998)).
161. 130 Cal. App. 4th 758 (2005).
162. Id. at 762.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. See infra notes 250-259 and accompanying text (noting typicality of multiple departures).
166. This history is referred to as "prior uncharged acts." Id. See supra note 86 (discussing
evidentiary framework governing domestic violence history).
167. Zavala, 130 Cal. App. 4th at 763.
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her arm, and cause several drinking glasses to shatter on the floor. 68 On
another occasion, he choked her until she lost breath in the presence of their
daughter.169 One time, he spit food at her and "challenged her by asking what
she was going to do about it.,, 17 0 "[S]hocked and scared," Alicia left home. 171
Another incident involved Mario slashing Alicia's tires, after telling her
that she was "not going anywhere."l72 After this episode,
Police responded to the 911 hang-up call, and saw the two front tires
had been deflated. [Alicia] showed police the bruises on her arm, and
told them she was afraid of her husband and scared for her children,
and that Zavala kept guns and a knife in the home. Police found four or
five rifles, two handguns and a knife inside the home, and removed the
weapons. [Alicia] took the children with her to her parents' house,
where they stayed that night. 173
The next day, Alicia obtained a protection order requiring removal from
the home,' 74 and transaction-bound domestic violence became stalking.17 5
Mario's course of conduct continued virtually unabated. He parked his car
in Alicia's driveway.176 He phoned her, sometimes without speaking and other
times with verbal abuse ("stupid bitch," again).177 He came to the home on their
son's birthday, and pushed past Alicia ("fuck you, bitch").' 78 He continued to
drive past the home, and once followed her to a shopping center.179 He called
Alicia's cell phone and threatened, "I'm going to kill you, just watch," and told
her the children would be better off with a foster parent than with her. 80 He left
messages "laced with vulgarities ... and threatening to kill her." 8 He cut




172. Id. at 763.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. To commit the offense of stalking in California, a defendant must "willfully, maliciously, and
repeatedly [follow] or willfully and maliciously [harass] another person and . . . [make] a credible threat
with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear for his or her safety." CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 646.9(a) (West 2012). The tem "harass" is defined as a "course of conduct directed at a specific person
that seriously alarms, annoys, torments, or terrorizes the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose."
CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(c) (West 2012). "Credible threat" is defined as a threat "made with the
apparent ability to carry out the threat so as to cause the person who is the target of the threat to
reasonably fear for his or her safety." CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(g) (West 2012).




180. Id. at 764. He added, "The next time they see me I'll be behind a glass wall." Id.
181. Id. The court noted, "During this time, Wife was taking precautions for her safety, including
staying at her parents' house, keeping her windows closed at night, and going around the block to make
sure Zavala was not in a position to intercept her before she could get inside the home." Id. at 765.
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power to her residence, took a vehicle from the garage, and vandalized Alicia's
motor home in back.182 He drove by in a truck and "waved and smiled" at
Alicia. 8 Shortly thereafter, Alicia went to the Police Department to meet with
a detective about the case against Mario.184 The detective later found that Mario
had signed the visitor's log next to Alicia's name. 85
Alicia was required to obtain a protection order for Mario's course of
conduct as a wholel86 to be deemed criminal. Separation turned domestic
violence into stalking, allowing for the latter to be legally remedied.
3. People v. Mustafa Siratl8 7
Mustafa Sirat and Bahijah Ab Salam were married in Germany in 1997.
The following year, they moved to the United States to live with Mustafa's
family. 88
Once there, Sirat began restricting Ab Salam's freedom. Ab Salam was not
allowed to have friends and she could not leave the house without Sirat's
permission. She was not even allowed to choose her own clothing or hairstyle.
She could only attend English classes and go to work.189
Shortly thereafter, Ab Salam' 90 discovered that she was pregnant.' 9' About
a month later, Sirat violently assaulted her, repeatedly kicking her in the
abdomen and causing her to miscarry.192 The court described the next two
months of the relationship as follows:
182. Id.
183. Id. This episode perfectly illustrates the importance of context to intimate partner violence.
Alicia was of course afraid of this wave and smile. Id. Alicia's and Mario's relationship-rather than the
acts themselves, in isolation-explains why. But only because Alicia had separated from Mario, and his
conduct was therefore viewed as stalking, was context considered.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See supra note 175.
187. 2002 Cal. App. LEXIS II (Apr. 16, 2002).
188. Id. at *2. Nowhere does opinion mention Ab Salam's immigration status, particularly whether
she was dependent on Sirat for residency status. On the enormous challenges facing immigrant battered
women, see Julie Dinnerstein, Working with Immigrant Victims of Domestic Violence, in LAWYERS
MANUAL ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: REPRESENTING THE VICTIM 277 (Jill Laurie Goodman & Dorchen
Leidholdt eds., 4th ed. 2005).
189. Sirat, 2002 Cal. App. LEXIS 11, at *2.
190. Because I am quoting extensively from the opinion and the court uses last names, I will do so
here as well.
191. Id. The onset of pregnancy is often a particularly dangerous time for women. See Deborah
Tucrkheimer, Conceptualizing Violence Against Pregnant Women, 81 IND. L.J. 667, 670-73 (2006).
192. Sirat, 2002 Cal. App. LEXIS I1, at *2-3. "She did not seek medical treatment immediately
because she did not have health insurance. Over the next two days, the bleeding increased; Ab Salam
became dizzy to the point she could hardly walk. Sirat took Ab Salam to the emergency room. ...
Hospital staff asked if she had been beaten. Ab Salam said she did not know how she was injured,
reluctant to tell the truth because she was afraid of Sirat." Id. at *3. This incident was ultimately charged
as an assault in conjunction with the stalking prosecution. Id. at * 1.
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Ab Salam continued to bleed heavily over the next several months. In
early June 1999, Sirat forced Ab Salam to have anal sex, angry that she
was still experiencing vaginal bleeding. Ab Salam did not report the
sodomy because she feared her husband and also felt it was
inappropriate to talk about the matter. She also hoped that her situation
would improve. 93
On June 30, 1999, Ab Salam and Sirat got into another argument
where Sirat again became violent. It began when Ab Salam told Sirat
she wanted to move out of his family's house to a place of her own. Ab
Salam was lying on her back on the bed. Sirat got on top of her,
planting his knees into her thigh and torso, grabbing her neck and
striking her. Sirat told her she did not have the right to choose where
she lived.194
The next morning, Ab Salam called a friend from English classes and
requested, "If anything happens to me, please call my parents in Morocco." 95
As a result of her friend's subsequent intervention, Ab Salam left the marital
residence and obtained a protection order.196 Soon after, she "decided to go
back to Sirat after he apologized to her," 97 and the two moved into an
apartment (apart from his family). But Sirat "began exhibiting new and strange
behavior," and "became very jealous of Ab Salam."l 98 The couple's
reconciliation lasted only a few months. In early November 1999, the two
separated 99-this time, long enough to recalibrate the criminal law's response
to Sirat's course of conduct. 200
The legally recognized stalking201 thus began when Sirat moved out of the
apartment.202 Immediately after moving out,203 he called her thirty to forty
193. When medical personnel inquired about the sources of bruises on her body, Ab Salam was
sufficiently fearful of Sirat that she again denied she had been beaten, claiming she had hit a table. Id. at
*3.
194. Id. at *4.
195. Id. at *5.
196. Id. at *6. Sirat's response upon receiving news from this friend that Ab Salam was "ill and
might die," was, "[b]etter she should die than not be here at home with me." Id.
197. Id. Ab Salam was reported to have "cancelled the restraining order, thinking things had
changed and they could start a new life together." Id. See infra notes 257-258 and accompanying text
(discussing the typicality of multiple departures). In this case, because Ab Salam later returned to Sirat,
obtaining an order of protection was not enough to transform domestic violence to stalking; more
(permanent-seeming) separation was required.
198. Sirat, 2002 Cal. App. LEXIS 11, at *6.
199. Id. Ab Salam stayed in the apartment, and Sirat moved back to the family's home. Id.
200. See supra note 197 (discussing the imperative that separation appear to be permanent).
201. For California's stalking definition, see supra note 175.
202. In its description of the stalking (as opposed to what preceded it), the court conceived of
Sirat's behavior as a pattern of control.
203. Sirat, 2002 Cal. App. LEXIS I1, at *6.
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times a day, leaving messages when she did not answer.204 He appeared almost
daily at the apartment, and often at her work.205 He threatened to commit
suicide after murdering her, and "several times threatened kill her if he caught
her with another man or if she left him permanently." 206
Interestingly, the court flashed back to the "past" domestic violence in
explaining why Ab Salam responded to these threats with fear:
Ab Salam took his threats seriously because he had been violent with
her in the past. Also, while they were together in the [ ] apartment,
Sirat had told her he had nightmares of strangling her. Once Ab Salam
was unable to find the kitchen knives when she wanted to cook. Sirat
said he had hidden the knives in their bedroom because he was worried
he might unwittingly kill her.207
On the day before his arrest, Sirat came to the apartment, "grabbed Ab
Salam tightly around her left arm and dragged her around the apartment to see
if a man was with her. . . . He again threatened to kill her if she was with
another man."208 The following day, Ab Salam phoned her attorney to request
another protection order. That evening, she saw Sirat waiting for her in his car
at the gate of the apartment complex.
He demanded that she let him into the apartment, threatening to kill her if
she refused. He made a slicing motion with his finger across his throat as he
said this. Ab Salam understood this gesture to mean he would kill her. She ran
to her apartment and locked herself in, barricading the door with chairs. Sirat
came to the door, and Ab Salam called the police. 209
When the police arrived, Ab Salam was "visibly shaken and crying." 210
While the officer was talking to Ab Salam, a neighbor knocked on her door.
"Startled by the knock," 211 and in response to all that had come before, Ab
Salam urinated on herself.2 12
From the perspective of criminal law,213 what mattered occurred just the
week before.
204. Id.
205. Id at *6-7.
206. Id at *7.
207. Id.
208. Id at *8. After he lcft, Ab Salam "locked the door, barricaded it with chairs, and called the
police. The police found Sirat outside the apartment. Inside the apartment, the officers found Ab Salam
obviously upset and afraid Sirat might enter. Ab Salam told the police she did not want to press charges
against Sirat, but only wanted him to leave her alone." Id..
209. Id. at *8-9.
210. Id at *9.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See supra notes 139-141 and accompanying text.
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4. State v. Whitesel2 14
The relationship between Julie and Jon Whitesell was violent almost from
the beginning. As a court would later describe:
The relevant facts of this case span over an 8-year period. Julie met
[Jon] Whitesell in 1989, became pregnant, and married him in 1990.
Whitesell and Julie rarely lived together as the relationship was
abusive from the start. When Julie and Whitesell did live together,
Julie would often flee with her children to her sister's house when
Whitesell became violent.215
The court recounted a litany of abuse occurring over the course of the
Whitesells' relationship.216 Jon threw Julie into a closet and refused to let her
out.217 He laid out all their knives in a pattern on the kitchen table.218 He pulled
Julie from the driver's seat and began driving dangerously fast until Julie
managed to jump out of the car and run away at a stop light.219 He threatened
her on the phone, telling her that she hadn't "seen anything yet" and that he
could find her if he needed.220 He threw water on her while she was sleeping
and told her that he was taking their daughter. When Julie tried to stop Jon from
driving away, he pounded her head against the steering wheel, shoved her to
the ground, and pulled her hair out.221 He disabled the air conditioner and
removed parts from Julie's car.222
After Julie obtained a protective order,223 Jon tried breaking into her
224 ,225home2. He told Julie that marriage was "till death do us part." He pushed
her, locked her in the bedroom, threw her into the corner and "pressed his
pelvis into her," like he was going to rape her. Instead he threw her in the hall
"with so much force that [her] foot went through the wall." 226
214. 13 P.3d 887 (Kan. 2000).
215. Id at 896. The court's recitation of facts includes various physical departures and returns on
the part of both Julie and Jon. For instance, Jon moved back into the house with Julie when she was
diagnosed with cancer. Id. See infra notes 250-259 and accompanying text.
216. Here too, the incident-based narrative is a byproduct of the applicable criminal-evidentiary
framework. See supra note 86.




221. See infra note 243 (detailing the conviction for this assault).
222. Whitesell, 13 P.3d at 896.
223. Given what came after (i.e., Julie's return to Jon), this act was not enough to transform





Once Jon threw a television set. When Julie tried to leave the home, he
slapped and kicked her, forcing her to escape to the bedroom with the children.
He kicked in the door to the bedroom. 228 He went to Julie's father's house
screaming for his gun.229 He broke into the garage.230 He called the prosecutor
and said that he had a gun and would kill Julie.231 He followed her, drove by
her house, and sent her a note referencing the ongoing O.J. Simpson trial.232 He
left suicide notes inside of her locked car and sent a birthday card that read, "I
will not quit!" 233
Julie filed for divorce234 and obtained a second protective order. This time,
legally sufficient separation was achieved; all that followed was deemed
stalking.235 Jon drove by her house by car and by bicycle, over and over
236 237
again. He parked nearby with his lights off and binoculars in the car. Once
he drove by while Julie's new boyfriend was mowing the lawn and "called
[her] a slut and a whore and told her to watch her back."238 Julie and a deputy
believed that Jon watched the house from a field near the yard.239 He sent her a
copy of the Kansas adultery statute and a bible with a handwritten inscription
saying that he would not quit.240 He followed Julie's boyfriend to work and
"confronted him about 'screwing his wife."' 241 Jon was subsequently arrested








234. Id. This was the second time Julie filed for divorce. The first time she dismissed the divorce
action after discovering that she was pregnant with Jon's baby. Id. at 896.
235. Id. at 897-98. The Kansas statute (at the time of the opinion) read in relevant part as follows:
"(a) Stalking is an intentional, malicious and repeated following or harassment of another person and
making a credible threat with the intent to place such person in reasonable fear for such person's
safety....
(d) For the purposes of this section:
(1) 'Course of conduct' means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time,
however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose and which would cause a reasonable person to suffer
substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the person.
Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of 'course of conduct.'
(2) 'Harassment' means a knowing and intentional course of conduct directed at a specific person that
seriously alarms, annoys, torments or terrorizes the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose.
(3) 'Credible threat' means a verbal or written threat or a threat implied by a pattern of conduct or a
combination of verbal or written statements and conduct made with the intent and the apparent ability to
carry out the threat so as to cause the person who is the target of the threat to reasonably fear for such
person's safety." Whitesell, 13 P.3d at 899 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3438 (1999)).
236. Whitesell, 13 P.3d at 897-98.
237. Id. at 897.




242. Id. See supra note 235 for the definition of stalking in Kansas at that time.
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The ongoing abuse that Julie endured before fulfilling the law's separation
requirement was disregarded.243
III. A THEORY OF IMPUTED CONSENT
Separation marks a legal receptivity to more fulsome accounts of intimate
partner abuse. In this Part, I will argue that criminal law's privileging of
breakups in this manner is problematic. I identify two separate but related
grounds for critique.
First, legal preoccupation with a moment of departure does not comport
with reality.244 As we will see, locating a singular instance of separation is
often arbitrary, particularly when context surrounding the violence is taken into
account. As such, ascribing separation with transforming power-i.e., by
defining it as the trigger for a strikingly different approach to criminalization-
makes little sense.245
If separation is thus an artificial designation, we might wonder whether
another purpose is served by the breakup. In discussing a second, more
profound, objection to the privileging of breakups,246 I will propose that
separation implicitly functions to define the border between violence that is
consented to (and therefore lawful), and violence that is not (hence unlawful).
The tacit imputation of consent helps to explain law's discrepant treatment of
battering and stalking.247 I will then expand on this theory by considering the
normative framework governing consent. This analysis shows that imputing
consent to women in abusive relationships cannot be squared with basic
understandings about the conditions required for consent.
A. The Transactional Breakup as Legal Fiction
The paradigm of the transactional breakup-one that occurs at a distinct
moment in time, upon mutual agreement by two parties248-hopelessly fails to
capture the complexities that attend ending abusive relationships. In these
relationships, separation is a process. Breaking up is often difficult,24 but the
243. With one exception, seven years of pre-separation battering went unnoticed by the criminal
justice system. The exception is that Jon was convicted of one count of domestic battery years earlier for
an attack that was witnessed by (and required the intervention of) several firemen. Whitesell, 13 P.3d at
896.
244. See infra Section ll.A.
245. Each of the case studies discussed above raises this issue.
246. See infra Section II.B.
247. Put differently, surfacing consent mythology helps to explain continued resistance to fully
criminalizing domestic violence.
248. See supra note 19 (referencing role of mutuality in breakups).
249. As Cheryl Hanna has written, "Just about everyone has been in a romantic relationship that, in
hindsight, should have ended sooner than it did. Why do people stay? Hope, or commitment, or because
they share a lease or she owns the car. Life and love are complicated, and, as Neil Sedaka sang,
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realities confronting battered women make separating from a partner distinctly
dangerous, complicated, and protracted.25o For these women, there is typically
no moment of breakup; rather, domestic violence victims "leave" relationships
multiple times, in different ways, to varying degrees of success.
In her seminal work on separation over two decades ago, Martha Mahoney
wrote:
The question "why didn't she leave" is actually an objectifying
statement that the woman did not leave. Asking this question often
makes actual separation disappear. . . . If we ask the woman, "What
did you do?" the answer very often turns out to be, "I sought help." . . .
When we ask the woman, "Exactly what did you do in your search for
help?" the answer often turns out to be that she left-at least
temporarily.251
In the years since Mahoney articulated this insight, empirical research has
enhanced our understanding of separation as process. 252 A developing social
science literature demonstrates,253 explains,254 and modelS255 a nonlinear
progression toward ending relationship violence. What we now know about this
dynamic process severely undermines the criminal law's insistence on a
breakup moment. In short, legal misconceptions of separation256 sit uneasily
with the ongoing struggles of battered women.
Most women describe numerous attempts to leave their abusers. In one
study of post-relationship stalking, 40% of a sample of battered women
reported that they made 1 to 5 attempts to leave, almost a quarter reported 6 to
10 attempts, 10% reported 11 to 40 attempts, and 16% reported that they "left
'Breaking up is hard to do."' Cheryl Hanna, Because Breaking Up Is Hard To Do, 116 YALE L.J.
POCKET PART 92 (2006).
250. Locating the divide between relationships that are abusive (and typically characterized by
breakup as process) and those are that not abusive (and subject to what I am calling the transactional
breakup) raises its own set of issues. But, as Deborah Denno has remarked, "There are many line-
drawing dilemmas throughout the criminal law." Deborah W. Denno, Crime and Consciousness:
Science and Involuntary Acts, 87 MINN. L. REV. 269, 274 (2002). My claim here does not rest on a sharp
differentiation between relationships that are violent and those that are not. Rather, I am asserting that in
abusive relationships, the notion of a transactional breakup tends to be undermined.
251. Martha Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90
MICH. L. REV. 1, 61 (1991).
252. See infra notes 253-266 and accompanying text. Notwithstanding this body of research, the
law still tends to fixate on separation. For a critical analysis, see MELISSA HAMILTON, EXPERT
TESTIMONY ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 147-152 (2009).
253. See infa notes 256-257 and accompanying text.
254. See in/fa notes 259-264 and accompanying text.
255. See infra notes 265-266 and accompanying text.
256. Although this discussion is confined to the criminal law context, legal misconceptions about
separation may distort the civil protection realm, as well. See Jane K. Stoever, F-reedom from Violence:
Using the Stages of Change Model to Realize the Promise of Civil Protection Orders, 72 OHIO ST. L.J.
303(2011).
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the relationship more times than they could count." 257 These figures confirm a
growing body of research showing the unlikelihood that an initial separation
from an abusive partner will ultimately succeed,258 and suggesting that battered
women "leave" relationships repeatedly.
Sarah Buel has observed "[t]hat abuse victims make many courageous
efforts to flee the violence is too often overlooked."259 Women stay for "many
valid reasons"260-reasons that explain the difficulty confronting women
attempting separation, as well. A nonexhaustive list of these challenges
includes financial dependence, housing needs, immigration-related concerns,
shame, religious teachings, familial pressures, hope for change, and love.261
Battered women who are mothers also confront especially acute dilemmas
related to their children.262
At its heart, the process of separation cannot be understood without
reference to the dangers that surround exit from violent relationships. Battered
women are legitimately fearful of leaving their abusers, for they put themselves
at the greatest risk of physical injury and death when doing So.263 More
broadly, control is ratcheted up when women attempt to separate. Martha
Mahoney named this dynamic "separation assault:"
Separation assault is the attack on the woman's body and volition in
which her partner seeks to prevent her from leaving, retaliate for the
separation, or force her to return. It aims at overbearing her will as to
where and with whom she will live, and coercing her in order to
enforce connection in a relationship. It is an attempt to gain, retain, or
257. Mechanic et al., supra note 35, at 51-52.
258. See, e.g., Andrew J. Martin et al., The Process of Leaving an Abusive Relationship: The Role
of Risk Assessments and Decision-Certainty, 15 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 109 (2000); James C. Roberts et al.,
Why Victims of Intimate Partner Violence Withdraw Protection Orders, 23 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 369
(2008).
259. Sarah M. Bucl, Fifty Obstacles of Leaving, a.k.a. Why Abuse Victims Stay, 28 COLO. LAW.19,
19(1999).
260. Id.
261. Id. See also supra note 251 and accompanying text (discussing separation assault).
262. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 191, at 680-81. ("[S]ingle mothers tend to live at or below the
poverty line, and welfare reform has only served to worsen their plight. Faced with the prospect of living
without sufficient food or shelter for themselves or their children, it is not surprising that many women
'choose' to remain in a relationship with a man who can help to provide these subsistence items-even
if the cost of the exchange is continued violence.") (citations omitted). See also id. at 683 (noting that
battered mothers "confront not only adverse material consequences, but a societal message that many
have internalized: children raised in households headed by single mothers are damaged emotionally,
developmentally, and financially").
263. A number of studies have documented the correlation between stalking and intimate partner
homicide or attempted homicide. LOGAN ET AL., supra note 28, at 7-8 (collecting research). One such
study found that 76% of women murdered by an intimate, and 85% of women who were victims of
attempted murder by an intimate, had been stalked prior to the attack. Id. (quoting J. McFarlane et al.,
Intimate Partner Stalking and Femicide: Urgent Implications for Women's Safety, 20 BEHAV. SC. & L.
51 (2002)). As Martha Mahoney has written, "The fact that marital separation increases the instigation
to violence shows that these attacks are aimed at preventing or punishing the woman's autonomy. They
are major-often deadly-power moves." (citation omitted). Mahoney, supra note 251, at 65.
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regain power in a relationship, or to punish the woman for ending the
relationship. It often takes place over time. 264
Just as the batterer's post-separation efforts to control the victim develop
265
over time, so too do the victim's attempts to leave evolve in response.
Breaking away from an abusive relationship entails a process. Progress is often
266halting, and change cyclical. Empirical and conceptual accounts thus suggest
that the paradigm of the transactional breakup is ill-suited to relationships
predicated on power and control. The criminal law's insistence that separation
occurs at a precise moment, unequivocally, to transfiguring effect, is in deep
tension with the realities of abuse.
Because an abusive course of conduct is ongoing throughout the stages of
relationship, it makes little sense for any given departure to carry the meaning
now accorded it. Yet the law turns a perceived breakup into the necessary
condition for contextualizing-and criminalizing-an abuser's behavior,
without regard to ongoing patterns that pre-existed the instant separation.267
The disconnect between this de facto separation requirement and the empirical
realities underlying it should give us pause.
Apart from its conceptual incoherence, it is worth noting that this burden of
separation imposes considerable costs on women who are victimized in
ongoing relationships. Unless they "leave" to the law's satisfaction, their
suffering must be endured without recourse. We might simply conclude that
intimate relationships continue to exist within a private sphere into which the
law does not interfere. But this would not account for intrusions into the
domain of intimacy where violence-certain forms, at least-has been found to
be unacceptable.
Interesting and important parallels can be drawn between the law's
discrepant treatment of intimate partner violence and its historical and
contemporary approach to marital rape. Once, the right of corporal
264. Mahoney, supra note 251, at 65-66.
265. For women's accounts of the dynamic process of separation, see id. at 66-68. See also Stoever,
supra note 256, at 324 ("In the context of domestic violence, the change an individual makes is
relational, and an understanding of [how abuse victims end the violence] must take into account the
influence of the partner and his reaction to this relationship change.").
266. One widely accepted psychological model of change-making has recently been applied to
explain the process of ending relationship violence: "Researchers discovered the validity of this
application by conducting in-depth interviews of women who had recently experienced domestic
violence or were currently in abusive relationships . . . . The women described five stages of change
[pre-contemplation, contemplation, preparation, action, and maintenance], consistent with the Stages of
Change Model. . . . The Stages of Change Model assumes that progression through the stages is a
dynamic process and posits that progress through the stages occurs in a cyclical, rather than linear,
sequence. It is expected that a survivor will revisit earlier stages as she moves toward maintenance ....
Essentially, ending violence is a process that occurs in stages, and the change is frequently iterative."
Stoever, supra note 256, at 323-24.
267. Any earlier periods of separation are inevitably overlooked as part of this differentiation
between relationship and post-relationship abuse. See, e.g., supra note 197.
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punishment268 and the marital rape exemption269 were justified; yet they are no
longer.270 This tells us that harms that occur within relationships can be (and
often are) criminalized without regard for continuing intimacy. But they are not
always so treated. In the case of nonphysical violence, relationship still makes
all the difference.
Why, in this case, does the law assign separation undue meaning? If
separation does not truly mark the onset of patterned abuse, why does it initiate
its criminalization? The next Section provides an answer.
B. Surfacing Consent Mythology
The law makes separation the pivot point for criminalizing patterns without
remark. Without acknowledging that departure matters-much less why it
matters-no rationale need be offered for treating abuse within relationships
differently from abuse without. To discern one, then, it is helpful to observe
how the criminal law reflects social biases regarding women who stay,271 just
- 272 -as it reinforces these very same misconceptions, all in service of seemingly
natural (and neutral) distinctions between battering and stalking.
The result is an exemption for relationship violence of a nonphysical kind.
This exemption is fully consistent with, and perhaps best explained by, tacit
attributions of consent. On this view, unless and until they leave the
relationship, women are believed to consent to the controlling course of
conduct. Separation sparks the shift in crime paradigms because separation
268. See supra notes 90-91.
269. See Jill Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CALIF. L. REV.
1373, 1375 (2000) ("At common law, husbands were exempt from prosecution for raping their wives.
Over the past quarter century, this law has been modified somewhat, but not entirely. A majority of
states still retain some form of the common law regime."). Similarities between the two selective
criminalization regimes and their underlying rationales, both expressed and implied, are striking.
270. But see supra text accompanying note 147.
271. Regarding this general dynamic, consider the following helpful description:
"[C]riminalization" constitutes an appropriate conceptual framework within which to gather together the
constellation of social practices which form the subject matter of criminal law on the one hand and
criminal justice and criminological studies on the other. . . . Escaping the notion of crimes as "given,"
the idea of criminalization captures the dynamic nature of the field as a set of interlocking practices in
which the moments of "defining" and "responding" to crime can rarely be completely distinguished and
in which legal and social (extra-legal) constructions of crime constantly interact. . . . [I]t allows the
instrumental and symbolic aspects of the field to be addressed, as well as encompassing empirical,
interpretive, and normative projects. It embraces questions about offenders and victims, individuals and
collectivities, state and society." Nicola Lacey, Legal Constructions of Crime, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF CRIMINOLOGY 197 (Mike Maguire et al., eds., 2007) (citations omitted).
272. "Social meaning plays a critical role in criminal law. Economists speak of criminal law as a
mechanism for pricing misconduct, but ordinary citizens think of it as a convention for morally
condemning it. Against the background of that expectation, the positions that the law takes become
suffused with meaning." Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning, Social Influence, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L.
REV. 349, 362 (1997). See also Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in
Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 352 (1996) ("Because criminal law expresses condemnation,
what a political community punishes, and how severely, tell a story about whose interests are valued and
how much.").
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marks the moment of nonconsent: nonconsent to the relationship and, thus,
nonconsent to relationship violence (the two are equated). 273
In sum, I am proposing a theory of imputed consent-or attributing consent
"when and because none has been granted in fact"274 -to explain the
differential treatment of abuse within and without relationships. This theory
may also partly explain the underenforcement of existing laws against assault
and rape. 275 Imputed consent reflects the endurance of formally repudiated
distinctions between the public and private realms.276 In this account, violence
within intimate relationships is justified as the product of choice on the part of
its victims. Within the realm of intimacy, the "sphere of choice," 277 what
would not be tolerated absent a relationship is quite acceptable for precisely
this reason: the existence of an ongoing relationship becomes a proxy for a
woman's consent to all that takes place within it (at least, to the point of
physical assault).
If this theory is correct, separation serves a function somewhat different
from defining the parameters of a novel course of conduct. The privileging of
separation does not correspond to the batterer's (changed) behavior. Instead, it
reflects implicit judgments of the victim's.
For present purposes, a few general observations about the nature of
consent are in order. Consent is morally transformative, insofar as it moves
wrongful conduct into the realm of the permissible.278 Consent has both a
descriptive279 and a normative component,280 and the latter is necessitated by its
273. See inpa Subsection Ill.B.2.
274. Heidi M. Hurd, Was the Frog Prince Sexually Molested?: A Review of Peter Westen 's The
Logic of Consent, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1329, 1341 (2005). See Peter Westen, THE LOGIC OF CONSENT
271 (2004) (claiming that imputed consent "consists of attributing prescriptive consent on persons that
do not possess it."). See also Peter Westen, Some Common Confusions About Consent in Rape Cases, 2
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 333, 337 (2004) (discussing areas of rape doctrine where "the law imputes such an
actual choice to her, despite her having neither experienced nor manifested it.").
275. See supra text accompanying note 147 .
276. See CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 100 (1987) ("in private, consent tends
to be presumed. It is true that a showing of coercion voids this presumption. But the problem is getting
anything private to be perceived as coercive. Why one would allow force in private-the 'why doesn't
she leave' question asked of battered women-is a question given its urgency by the social meaning of
the private as a sphere of choice.").
277. Id.
278. As Franklin Miller and Alan Wertheimer write in their preface to a notable collection of works
on consent, "A requirement of consent, from a moral perspective, protects people from unauthorized
invasions of their bodies and property. In addition to its protective function, consent is a facilitative
moral power. Our consent makes interpersonal conduct permissible that would otherwise be prohibited
as wrongful." Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer, Preface: The Ethics ofConsent, in THE ETHICS OF
CONSENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE ix (Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wetheimer eds., 2010). See also John
Kleinig, The Nature of Consent, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra, at 3, 12
("[C]onsent transforms the moral relations that exist between persons.").
279. My claims do not depend on whether consent is an internal state of mind or requires an
outward manifestation of a mental state. See Kleinig, supra note 278, at 9-11 (discussing this as a broad
area of disagreement among philosophers). See also Vera Bergelson, Consent to Harm, in THE ETHICS
OF CONSENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 278, at 163, 175 ("Conceptually, factual consent may
be understood in one of two ways: either as the consenter's subjective state of mind, that is, his
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281moral force. With regard to normative content, it is accepted that consent
must be given voluntarily282 and intentionally283 by a competent person with
knowledge.284 These requirements are sometimes framed in terms of
autonomy.285
With these parameters in mind, it becomes apparent that implicit
attributions of consent are misplaced.286 On analysis, the legal imputation of
consent cannot withstand scrutiny. Women do not consent to relationship
violence, even287 the nonphysical, and even violence that is inflicted over time.
Axiomatic understandings of what consent requires simply cannot be squared
with the realities of abuse victims' lives.288 In other words, departure is not the
willingness to agree with what another person proposes (factual attitudinal consent), or the consenter's
expression of acquiescence by words or conduct (factual expressive consent).").
280. See Tom L. Beauchamp, Autonomy and Consent, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND
PRACTICE, supra note 278, at 55, 56 (claiming that the "distinction between the factual and the moral is
vital, but it may foster precarious claims such as: (1) analysis of consent and autonomy are conceptual
and empirical tasks, not moral ones; and (2) a theory of consent and a theory of autonomy should not be
grounded in moral notions, but on a theory of mind, self, or person"); Brian H. Bix, Contracts, in THE
ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra, at 251, 253 ("[I]f one treats the presence or
absence of consent as an empirical matter, there remain normative questions in moral and legal inquiries
to determine the effect of the consent in question."); Kleinig, supra note 278, at 4 ("Consent is not a
neutral act that is then separately justified as having normative force, but is normative through and
through even though it also has a descriptive content.").
281. See Kleinig, supra note 278, at 13 ("As an act that morally transforms a situation, it must
satisfy certain conditions-in particular, those for constituting it responsible behavior.").
282. "If A is coerced into doing what ordinarily signifies consent.... he does not act voluntarily
and what he does does not constitute consent." Id.at 14-15.
283. "When A consents to *, A consents to 4 under a certain description . . . . In certain
circumstances, it will be important to specify fairly precisely what is consented to." Id. at 17-18.
284. "If consent is to be a communicative act for which responsibility is presupposed, it must be the
act of an agent who is competent to consent; it must be voluntary, in the sense of being free from
coercion; it must be based on understanding, in the sense that it is appropriately informed; and it must be
intentional." Id. at 13. Because voluntariness and intentionality are so evidently lacking in abusive
relationships, I focus the discussion here, and I do not address the remaining conditions of competence,
see id. at 13-14, or of knowledge, see id. at 16-17.
285. See Beauchamp, supra note 280, at 65 (articulating an account of autonomy that "is based on
analysis of autonomous action in terms of normal choosers who act (1) intentionally, (2) with
understanding, and (3) without controlling influences"). For a different conception, see generally
Kathryn Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency: Feminist Perspectives on Self-Direction, 40 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 805 (1999).
286. This is true whether we view consent in moral or legal terms. The discussion that follows will
focus on the conditions of consent that give it moral power. For present purposes, it suffices to note that
these same conditions characterize the law's various formulations of valid consent. This overlap is of
course not coincidental. See Kleinig, supra note 278, at 4 ("Although consent figures quite importantly
in certain formalized contexts-especially the law-it draws its strength in those contexts from the sense
that I have characterized as morally transformative.").
287. It may be more accurate to say "especially," rather than "even," since ongoing abuse of a
nonphysical nature tends to be the most harmful aspect of domestic violence. See supra notes 30-40 and
accompanying text.
288. Questions about battered women's agency are endemic to feminist theorizing. See, e.g.,
Katharine K. Baker, Dialectics and Domestic Abuse, 110 YALE L.J. 1459, 1465 (2001) ("What does
women's continued presence in battering relationships say about their ability to act as their own agents?
If they feel compelled to stay, does that make them incapable of protecting themselves?"). When the
state contemplates taking actions that are contrary to what a battered woman would choose, this tension
is especially acute. Cheryl Hanna has elaborated on this tension: "Whether autonomy and the right to
make one's own decisions offer more liberation for women, or are false notions masking subordination,
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consensual fulcrum that the criminal law imagines. Accordingly, I will argue
that the legal meaning of separation is tenuous and in need of revision.
In the next sections, I will examine the workings of abusive relationships in
order to challenge the law's implicit attribution of consent.289 We will see that
many women in relationships of ongoing abuse are not consenting to stay,290
and that those who are consenting to stay are not consenting to the ongoing
abuse.291 In short, the preconditions for consent-particularly voluntariness 292
293and intentionality 2 are vitiated by the ongoing course of conduct that is
domestic violence.
Before defending these assertions, I wish to draw one final distinction
between the criminal law's response to intimate partner violence and its
response to violence more generally. Even where consent is given, this consent
294is not always reflected in the law. With few exceptions, the criminal law
declines to acknowledge a victim's consent to physical harm as a defense to
prosecution.295 Consensual harm may violate the victim's rights or her
dignity.296 Either way, there may be good reasons to punish consensual harm.
297
continues to be debated in feminist legal scholarship. In practice, most victims want the violence in their
relationships to stop and to that extent will cooperate with the state. Many women, however, will resist
outcomes that involve criminal records, jail, fines, or other punitive measures. When a woman wants her
partner to receive treatment despite a serious offense or his long-term dangerousness, the prosecutor and
judge must navigate the tricky waters between a victim's personal autonomy and concerns for public
safety and justice." Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox of Hope: The Crime and Punishment of Domestic
Violence, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1505, 1556-57 (1998).
My argument is somewhat orthogonal to this issue. I contend that a battered woman is not actually
consenting to violence, as opposed to the claim that she is consenting to violence but that we should
nevertheless disregard this consent because she is insufficiently agentic.
289. See infa Subsections Ill.B.1-2.
290. See infra Subsection IlI.B. I.
291. See infra Subsection Ill.B.2.
292. See supra note 282 and accompanying text.
293. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
294. See Bergelson, supra note 279, at 165 ("Today, American law continues to maintain that one's
life and body do not quite belong to him. Courts habitually disregard the voluntary nature of private
harmful interactions, citing various public policies. Among those are concerns that private violence may
disturb peace; that the injured person may become public charge; and that harmful conduct has no social
utility, is immoral, and expresses the parties' disrespect to law and social order.").
295. See id ("[T]he individual's power to authorize an act that may affect his physical well-being
remains strictly limited."). As a rule, any harmful act that does not fall within an exception for athletics
or medical treatment is criminal unless the injury is not serious. Id. at 166. As Vera Bergelson notes,
however, "assessment of the seriousness of the victim's injury determines the outcome of many cases
involving consensual harm." Even the Model Penal Code admits that this assessment is often influenced
by "moral judgments about the iniquity of the conduct involved." Id. at 168. For more on this normative
aspect of evaluating harm, see Cheryl Hanna, Sex is Not a Sport: Consent and Violence in Criminal
Law, 42 B.C. L. REV. 239, 249-256 (2001).
296. See Bergelson, supra note 279, at 177 (noting the growing scholarly recognition that the
concept of criminal harm is not limited to violations of one's autonomy, but also includes violations of
dignity). See also id. at 179 ("The two kinds of criminal harm comprise the same evil-objectification of
another human being. That evil may be brought by an injury to a vital human interest, combined with
either a rights violation (e.g., theft) or disregard of the victim's dignity (e.g., consensual deadly torture).
The absolute majority of criminal offenses, being nonconsensual, include both kinds of harm.").
297. Id. at 179.
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For now, I will not pursue this line of thought. Since battered women
ordinarily do not consent to abuse in their relationships, it follows that the legal
29attribution of the contrary is unsound.298 Indeed, it makes little sense to
attribute consent to a category of people who are not actually consenting.299
Given the meaning of consent, the current rule is unjustified.
1. (Non)Consent to Violent Relationships
We have already observed that battered women often remain in abusive
relationships because they cannot escape them.300 Abuse is about control, 0 l
and control makes leaving difficult,302 if not impossible.303 Many women stay
304because, for all practical purposes, they are trapped3. Since a sine qua non for
consent is voluntariness, 305 these women in this position do not consent to their
ongoing relationships.
Recall that the course of conduct that characterizes abuse is
quintessentially coercive 306-in particular with respect to a woman's decision
to end the relationship.307 This state of coercion is incompatible with the
prerequisites for consent, especially the voluntariness condition.
298. In other words, the question of whether law ought to recognize (actual) consent is not at issue
here, as I will soon show. See infra notes 300-328 and accompanying text.
299. For the purposes of this argument, I need not claim (and I do not claim) the factual
impossibility of consent to harm under these circumstances. An extraordinary case could entail actual
consent and thus raise the question of an appropriate criminal law response. This inquiry would almost
inevitably be tethered to judgments about women's injuries and the extent to which they are worthy of
redress. See supra note 295 (claiming that evaluating the severity of injury is a subjective enterprise). Cf
Hanna, supra note 295, at 250 (noting that, in judicial determinations of whether to allow consent as a
defense, "what is legally relevant is the social utility of the activity itself').
300. See supra notes 251-264 and accompanying text. Given the absence of the preconditions for
consent, it seems exceedingly unlikely that there is legitimate reason to impute consent where factual
consent is missing. That said, if my theory of imputed consent (and the gap that it purports to explain)
prompts efforts to articulate just such a rationale, the arguments could of course be evaluated.
301. See Mahoney, supra note 251, at 53 ("Battering is about domination: 'Violence is a way of
'doing power' in a relationship,' an effort by the batterer to control the woman who is the recipient of
the violence.") (quoting JAN E. STETS, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND CONTROL 110 (1998)). See also id. at
53-61 (urging attention to "the interplay of power and control, domination and subordination in the
battering relationship").
302. See supra notes 251-264 and accompanying text.
303. I am contemplating women who kill their abusers, women who are killed by their abusers, and
women who are abused until they die.
304. See STARK, supra note 25, at 13 (suggesting that "coercive control is a liberty crime rather
than a crime of assault").
305. See supra note 282 and accompanying text.
306. See supra Section l.A.
307. Dalton has offered these observations: "By the time a woman acknowledges to herself that she
cannot control the violence, and that it is not an aberration, but a permanent aspect of her relationship
with her partner, she may be in too deep to make an easy escape. She may have made efforts to seek
help, and found little response, whether from police, the courts, her doctor, her priest, pastor or rabbi, or
even other members of her family. Those efforts may have elicited threats from her partner about what
he will do if she discloses his violence to others, or seeks to leave him-threats that are perfectly
credible given his past behavior. She may have children by now, locking her in to a co-parenting
relationship from which she fears, with justification, that the legal system will not allow her to withdraw
To act voluntarily,308 a person must be "free of controls exerted either by
external sources or internal states that rob the person of self-directedness." 309
Thus, consent is invalid 310 when a person is coerced 3 11 or when she acts under
duress.312 Under these circumstances, a person's assent is involuntary, and
therefore not morally or legally persuasive. 314 For women who would leave the
relationship if only they could, the batterer's violence and control negate
voluntariness. These victims remain in their relationships, but they do so
involuntarily, and therefore nonconsensually.
But some women would not leave their abusers, even if they could.
These victims may want the relationship to continue for any number of
unless she abandons her children to her abuser. Her batterer is likely to reinforce those fears, telling her
that if she tries to leave she will lose her children. She may be daunted by the economic realities of
escape-how to find shelter, food, a job, or child care-when she has no separate funds, and cannot
even use a check or credit card without revealing her whereabouts to her batterer." Clare Dalton,
Domestic Violence, Domestic Torts and Divorce: Constraints and Possibilities, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV.
319, 337 (1997).
308. This account distills overarching norms and themes that span doctrinal areas. Cf. Miller &
Wertheimer, supra note 278, at x (criticizing a lack of "cross-fertilization" across different domains, and
framing consent as best understood by the application of "hybrid vigor," which includes consideration of
contrasts, sexual consent, and medical procedures). Fourth Amendment consent doctrine is yet another
useful lens through which to view questions of voluntariness. See, e.g., Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing
Consent, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211 (2001); Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and
the Psychology ofCoercion, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 153.
309. Beauchamp, supra note 280, at 69.
310. But see Kleinig, supra note 278, at 14 ("If A is coerced into what ordinarily signifies
consent ... he does not act voluntarily and what he does does not constitute consent. Some might argue
that in such cases consent is given but, because it is coerced, it is not valid. But invalid consent no more
counts as consent than an invalid vote counts as a vote. It has form but no substance. It is, I believe,
more accurate to say that although A gave his assent, this did not amount to consent.").
311. Beauchamp, supra note 280, at 69 ("Coercion occurs if a credible and intended threat disrupts
and reorders a person's self-directed course of actions. Under these coercive conditions, even intentional
and well-informed actions can be nonvoluntary.").
312. "Assent that is given under duress does not have the moral force of consent." Kleinig, supra
note 278, at 12; see also Bix, supra note 280, at 258 (characterizing undue influence as a "combination
of overpersuasion by one party and vulnerability or susceptibility by the other party").
313. C' Beauchamp, supra note 280, at 70-71 ("[A]cts can satisfy both the conditions of
understanding and the absence of controlling influence to a greater or lesser extent. . . . Actions are
autonomous by degrees, as a function of satisfying these conditions to differing degrees. A continuum of
both understanding and noncontrol runs from full understanding and begin entirely noncontrolled to full
understanding and being fully in control. Cut-off points on these continua are required for the
classification of an action as either autonomous or nonautonomous.").
314. See Kleinig, supra note 278, at 16 ("Ensuring the voluntariness of agreements is one of the
conditions that enables acts of consent to constitute a responsible transformation of the moral landscape
for those who are party to it.").
315. These two categories are not entirely discrete. As Sally Goldfarb has explained, "Women have
many reasons for staying with or returning to violent partners, including financial dependency, fear of
retaliation, social isolation, community pressure, and concern about losing custody of children." Sally
Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders for Domestic Violence: Can Law Help End the Abuse
Without Ending the Relationship, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1487, 1499 (2008). As this list suggests, at times
it may be difficult to identify whether any given reason for staying in a relationship is consistent with
voluntariness. What would generally fall within this category are cases where "the woman has a deep
emotional bond with her partner and wants to preserve and improve the relationship." Id.
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reasons,316 some of which sit uneasily with established conceptions of
voluntariness. 317 But, in such cases, we need not decide the difficult question of
whether staying in the relationship satisfies the criteria for consent to the
relationship. For even assuming arguendo that it does, consent to the violence
does not follow.
2. (Non) Consent to Violence
Consent to a relationship, even one in which abuse is ongoing, is not
synonymous with consent to further violence. Established understandings of
consent embed a requirement of intentionality. As a corollary, the scope of
consent must be closely circumscribed.3t 9
In the domestic violence context, the meaning of intentionality has been
markedly undertheorized. Largely absent from sociolegal accounts is the
insight that a woman may consent to the continuation of a relationship that is
abusive while, at the same time, fully desiring an end to the violence itself.320
To the extent she experiences further abuse in this relationship, this violence is
properly conceptualized as involuntary, and thus nonconsensual.321
Although the frequency with which battered women in fact consent to
322further relations with their partners can be overstated, this scenario
316. Goldfarb has written: "[A]busive relationships are often multidimensional, with episodes of
abuse occurring in a context that also includes positive attributes like mutual emotional commitment,
companionship, intimacy, and sharing. Battered women's feelings about their relationships frequently
include hope for the future and a willingness to forgive, traits that are generally considered admirable
human qualities and that can be a source of personal strength." Id. at 1500.
317. While advocating for legal reform that "permit[s] a woman to choose whether she wants to
leave her abuser instead of making that decision for her," Goldfarb concedes that "abusive relationships
can be so damaging that they actually interfere with, rather than promote, women's autonomy." Id. at
1502. See also Dalton, supra note 307, at 337 ("She may also, if the abuse has been prolonged and
severe, be in a state of psychological depletion and paralysis that makes it almost impossible for her to
take charge of her life in such new and risky ways. In this situation, she may marshall [sic] all the
resources at her disposal to control the violence as best she can from within the relationship, and keep
herself and her children safe from day to day, without triggering the explosive rage she knows from
experience is associated with any attempt on her part to challenge her partner's control, or set limits with
him."); Hanna, supra note 288, at 1558-59 (claiming that battered women's hope "masks a deeper sense
of powerlessness").
318. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
319. See Kleinig, supra note 174, at 17-18 ("Consent is relatively determinate, and ... some
conventional expectations can usually be assumed to inform such acts of consent.").
320. In the case of physical violence, the rule of nonconsent has become more generally accepted;
criminal law reflects this understanding. See Siegel, supra note 20, at 2129; Tuerkheimer, supra note 6,
at 970-71.
321. See supra Subsection III.B.1 (analyzing voluntariness with respect to the ongoing
relationship).
322. This is an empirical question with strong normative dimensions. See supra note 315 (noting
the difficulty of classifying a woman's professed reasons for staying in the relationship as
voluntary/involuntary; or, in effect, of identifying agentic expression). I suspect that recent scholarly
attention to this fact pattern may unwittingly have distorted its prevalence, particularly in proportion to
cases involving nonconsensual relationships.
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undoubtedly occurs.323 Yet, in these cases, women's nonconsent to violence is
socially and legally eclipsed by their wish to preserve their relationship. As a
result, consent to continuing the relationship is equated with consent to
violence.324
This imputed consent325 cannot be squared with the realities of battered
women's lives. 326 Women who are not seeking to end their relationships often
engage in active efforts to end the violence.327 Where these attempts have
proven ineffectual, women nevertheless persist in struggling to manage the
violence.328 In short, what we know about battered women requires a
conceptual and legal division of consent to violence from consent to
relationship.
When it comes to episodic physical violence, this decoupling has already
occurred. The dominant social view of physical violence as consented to within
a relationship has advanced.329 No longer does the existence of a relationship
provide an exemption to prosecution for crimes involving physical injury. But
there lingers a widespread perception that nonphysical violence 330 is consented
to by women who remain with their abusers. Such cases therefore remain
outside of our criminal law. Until consent to relationship and consent to
violence are unyoked, the legal meaning of separation will endure.
323. See Goldfarb, supra note 315, at 1500-01 ("For a substantial number of women who find
themselves in [abusive] relationships, the ideal outcome would be to eliminate the abuse while keeping
the relationship.").
324. But see Hanna, supra note 288, at 244-45 ("[W]omen cannot implicitly consent to violence by
refusing to press charges or cooperate with the prosecution.").
325. More precisely, this type of consent may be described as constructive consent, a "species of
imputed consent" in which "the victim's acquiescence to one act presupposes acquiescence to some
other act too." Bergelson, supra note 279, at 175-76. See also Westen, supra note 274, at 272-80
(discussing constructive consent).
326. A number of legal scholars who have experienced abuse and/or worked with abuse victims
have emphatically articulated this point. See, e.g., Mary Becker, Passions of Battered Women, 8 WM &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 59 (2001) ("Many remain-despite the violence--deeply attached to their
abusers and hope repeatedly that the abuse has ended. That is why they stay."); Bucl, supra note 259, at
22 ("A victim may say she still loves the perpetrator, although she definitely wants the violence to
stop."); Hanna, supra note 288, at 1558-59 ("Women 'stay' for many reasons.... Many women believe
that the violence will stop and the relationship will improve if only . . . (fill in the blank)." (ellipsis in
original)). See also Dalton, supra note 307, at 336-38. In my experience prosecuting domestic violence
cases, victims-even those refusing to cooperate with the State, and even those wishing to continue their
relationships-did not consent to their abuse.
327. See, e.g., Kate Cavanagh, Understanding Women's Responses to Domestic Violence, 2
QUALITATIVE Soc. WORK 229, 234 (2003) (describing a recurring theme of her interviews with abuse
victims that "women actively struggled to make the relationship nonviolent and devised strategies to this
end").
328. Id. at 246 ("Women struggled continuously to change the man's violent behaviour. At some
points in time the struggle to change took second place to the struggle to survive but not even women
subjected to the extremes of abuse totally 'gave up."').
329. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
330. See supra note 27 (explaining this term).
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C. Masochism Modernized
In the past century, the idea that battered women enjoy their abuse 33' has
gone from widespread acceptance332 to social scientific repudiation. In large
part due to the efforts of feminist activists and researchers, 334 the notion that
victims of abuse are masochistic335 has been exposed as myth 336-albeit one
with continued staying power.337
331. See generally, e.g., Helcnc Deutsch, The Significance of Masochism in the Mental Life of
Women, II INT'L J. PSYCHOANALYSIS 48 (1930). Deutsch was a disciple of Freud. See also Joan S.
Meier, Notes from the Underground: Integrating Psychological and Legal Perspectives on Domestic
Violence in Theory and Practice, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1295, 1301 n.13 (1993).
332. "In the 1960s and 1970s, the psychological view of battered women supported the feminist
contention that professionals 'blam[ed] the victim.' The prevailing view was that battered women were
masochistic and that the violence filled this need." G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory
Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the Conservatization of the Battered Women's Movement, 42 HOUS. L.
REV. 237, 254 (2005) (quoting SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISITIONS AND
STRUGGLES OF THE BATTERED WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 22 (1982)). Joan Mcicr has described the
psychoanalytic origins of this perspective: "[l]n the 1930s, the rise of Freudian psychoanalytic thought,
while viewing family violence as deviant and unhealthy, focused on female 'masochism' as the reason
for women's victimization. The 'pathologizing' of domestic violence 'reflected and reinforced the
societal belief that spouse abuse was an isolated problem in unusually disturbed couples in which the
violence was viewed as "fulfilling masochistic needs of the wife and necessary for the wife's (and the
couple's) equilibrium.'"" Meicr, supra note 331, at 1301 (quoting ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC
TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL
TIMES TO THE PRESENT 158; Elaine Hilberman, Overview: The 'Wife-Beater's Wife' Reconsidered, in
THE GENDER GAP IN PSYCHOTHERAPY 213 (Elaine (Hiberman) Carmen & Patricia Ricker eds., 1984)).
333. Michael Dowd, Battered Women: A Perspective on Injustice, I CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 13
(1993) (stating that the theory of battered women's masochism has been "widely debunked by
sociologists and psychologists."). See also Linda Kelly, Stories from the Front: Seeking Refuge for
Battered Immigrants in the Violence Against Women Act, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 665, 688 (1998) (arguing
against a "return to the erroneous stereotype of the battered woman as masochist").
334. See Ruth Jones, Guardianship Jbr Coercively Controlled Battered Women: Breaking the
Control ofthe Abuser, 88 GEO. L.J. 605, 614 (2000) ("The first generation of feminist researchers had to
challenge early research and the widespread belief that battered women were to blame for or somehow
caused their own abuse."). See also Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of
Feminist Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 541 n.83 (1992)
(outlining feminist critiques of psychological approaches to understanding domestic violence).
335. LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 20 (1979) ("By masochism, it is meant that [the
battered woman] experiences some pleasure, often akin to sexual pleasure, through being beaten by the
man she loves."). Anne M. Coughlin has observed that "[t]he literature on battered woman syndrome
does not offer a sophisticated description of the construct 'masochism."' Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing
Women, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1, 60 n.297 (1994).
336. The debunking of this myth has been facilitated by the widespread admissibility of expert
testimony that more accurately explains why women stay in abusive relationships. See, e.g., State v.
Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 370 (1984) (citing WALKER, supra note 335, at 70). According to Lenore Walker's
original formulation of the theory, women stay in abusive relationships, not because they find pleasure
in the pain of violence, but because they continue to love their partners, and have become helpless to
effectuate change. As empirical understandings of the effects of battering have evolved, expert
testimony has in recent years become more encompassing and less focused on helplessness, mitigating
the pathologizing effects of the syndrome. See also Sarah M. Bucl, Effective Assistance of Counsel for
Battered Women Defendants: A Normative Construct, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 217, 277-80 (2003).
337. See Meier, supra note 331, at 1301-02 ("Although Freudian concepts of 'female masochism'
are less in favor today, modern psychiatric evaluations still frequently diagnose battered women as
'paranoid,' or having any of a number of character disorders such as 'Schizoid Personality Disorder,'
'Borderline Personality,' 'Dependent Personality Disorder,' etc."). See also Coughlin, supra note 335, at
61 n.301 (stating that clinicians continued to use masochism to supplement alternative explanations for
Yet alongside this progress, our substantive criminal law continues to
impose a separation requirement, the effect of which is to exempt abuse in
ongoing relationships. I have offered a theory of imputed consent to explain
this exemption: unless and until they leave the relationship, women are
believed to consent to the controlling course of conduct. Separation sparks the
shift in crime paradigms because separation marks the moment of nonconsent:
nonconsent to the relationship and, thus, nonconsent to relationship violence
(the two are equated).
If this conceptualization is accurate, masochism has a new face.339 We no
longer contend that women enjoy physical violence; to this extent, the old lore
has been put to rest.340 But women who remain with their batterers are
considered perpetually consenting to all nonphysical manifestations of violent
control.34
Whether these women are thought to experience pleasure from the abusive
course of conduct is beside the point. 342 For whatever reason, they are
perceived as choosing to remain in their relationships343 and therefore choosing
to experience what comes along with them. The nonepisodic abuse is not
disentangled from the relationship itself, and consent to both is attributed to the
battered woman who stays.344
why women remain in abusive relationships). Accounts of battered woman syndrome have themselves
been criticized for describing masochism in only slightly modified terms: "[B]y characterizing love as a
compelling force that bends women to the wills of violent men and, particularly, by coupling that
construction of 'love' with the other explanations concerning the special psychological deficits of
women, the defense constitutes a trivial redefinition of the popular meaning of masochism . . . .
According to the defense, women may not taste 'masochistic' erotic pleasure in brutal beatings, but they
tenaciously cling to the men who dole out the beatings because they 'love' those men. This explanation
would seem to be masochism sanitized of eroticism-only the woman's sexual pleasure is omitted. The
defense thus offers an explanation of the woman's conduct that exploits the popular understanding of
women's masochism with only that one slight adjustment, seemingly calculated to make the explanation
more acceptable to a decisionmaker who is being asked to treat the woman sympathetically." Coughlin,
supra note 335, at 60-61.
338. See supra Section II.C.
339. See infra note 341.
340. Assaulting one's wife is a crime and, while underenforced, is of course prosecuted frequently.
341. This view may arise from misconceptions about violent control and an incorrect equation of
this dynamic with the kind of influence that intimate partners often have over one another in
relationships. See supra notes 135-147 and accompanying text (describing violent control and its harm).
Imputed consent may also stem from misunderstandings of the conditions of battered women's lives.
See infra Section Ill.B.
342. The new face may seem to distort the old concept almost beyond recognition. Most notably,
the iteration of masochism that finds expression today is not only sanitized of erotic pleasure, see
Coughlin, supra note 335, at 61, but of pleasure altogether. I suggest that this makes sense if we see the
concept as effectively unmoored from its Freudian roots (and from the realm of psychology altogether),
and newly tethered to the legitimizing framework of legal consent.
343. Cf Abbe Smith, Criminal Responsibility, Social Responsibility, and Angry Young Men:
Reflections of a Feminist Criminal Defense Lawyer, I N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 433, 466 (1994)
("Society attributes a number of choices to battered women who kill: first they choose the wrong guy,
then they choose to marry (or live with or date) him, then they choose to be beaten (or accept it or fail to
successfully resist it), then they choose to stay, and then they choose to kill him.").
344. It might also be the case that the criminal law distinguishes between abuse in ongoing
relationships and abuse in ended relationships based on a differing conception of harm. Since such a
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All of this confirms that the perennial question of "why didn't she leave"
endures345  -albeit in a variation that may serve to legitimate (and revitalize)
it.346 As others have persuasively argued, the question is of concern, both
because it indicates skepticism of all answers,347 and because of the troubling
assumptions that it embeds. 348
Without denying the continuing power of these critiques, I mean to suggest
that the meaning of "why doesn't she leave" has evolved. Staying once meant
that a woman was generally disbelieved when she alleged abuse, since it could
hardly be fathomed that anyone would experience such abuse and not leave.349
But another possibility is raised by the law's inconsistent treatment of abuse
within and without relationship: the woman's account is both credited and
legally discounted. Rather than assume that she wasn't abused if she stayed, the
law presumes just the opposite-i.e., she stayed, hence she consented to the
nonphysical abuse. To the extent "why didn't she leave," was ever a question, it
is no longer. It is a proclamation that she didn't leave, and that real
consequences for the construction of crime flow from this.
distinction would seem implicitly to rely on a theory of imputed consent, I do not separately address this
possibility.
345. The stated inquiry has received considerable attention by feminist activists and theorists over
the decades. For instance, Ann Jones articulated this critique: "Despite the immense achievements of the
battered women's movement in the past fifteen years, those who work to stop violence against women-
those who staff the hotlines and the shelters and the legal service centers, those who press to make law
enforcement and criminal justice act responsibly, those who lobby for legislative reform-know that the
next time a woman is battered . . . few people will ask: What's wrong with that man? What makes him
think he can get away with that? Is he crazy? Did the cops arrest him? Is he in jail? When will he be
prosecuted? Is he likely to get a serious sentence? Is she getting adequate police protection? Are the
children provided for? Did the court evict him from her house? Does she need any other help? Medical
help maybe, or legal aid? New housing? Temporary financial aid? Child support? No, the first question,
and often the only question, that leaps to mind is: Why doesn't she leave?" ANN JONES, NEXT TIME,
SHE'LL BE DEAD: BATTERING AND How TO STOP IT 131 (1994).
346. See supra note 342 (citing the legitimizing framework of consent).
347. For an overview of answers to the question of "why didn't she leave?", see Dalton, supra note
307, at 336-38.
348. See Goldfarb, supra note 315, at 1499 n.70 ("As many commentators have pointed out, 'Why
doesn't she leave?' is a misguided question for several reasons, including its implication that battered
women don't leave, its assumption that leaving would guarantee safety, and its focus on the victim's
actions rather than the perpetrator's."); Mahoney, supra note 251, at 64 ("Every legal case that discusses
the question 'why didn't she leave?' implies that the woman could have left. We need to challenge the
coercion of women's choices, reveal the complexity of women's experience and struggle, and recast the
entire discussion of separation in terms of the batterer's violent attempts at control."); Martha Minow,
Choices and Constraints: For Justice Thurgood Marshall, 80 GEo L. J. 2093, 2101 (1992) ("Feminist
commentators tend to reject this question because it blames the woman and because it neglects the
constraints she may experience due to economic dependency and a commitment to her children. Instead,
feminist critics emphasize these constraints and call for attention to questions about why men batter
women, how women can be justified when they defend themselves against intimate violence, and what
changes in police practices, child custody rules, and shelter and employment programs would help
battered women.").
349. I do not mean to suggest that this no longer occurs. See, e.g., Stoever, supra note 256, at 338
(observing that "[t]he survivor's failure to leave earlier often negatively affects the court's view of her
credibility").
CONCLUSION
It has been assumed that the law now criminalizes behavior in a
relationship-neutral manner. Certain conduct is wrongful, and codified as such,
regardless of how the victim is known to the perpetrator.
Close analysis of the law's response to intimate partner violence challenges
this conventional understanding. When violence is domestic, it is partially
criminalized:3o only isolated physical incidents count. This approach is turned
on its head when domestic violence becomes stalking. Now, an entire course of
conduct comes into legal view (though it is wrongly assumed to have begun at
the breakup). Until now, these competing crime paradigms have gone
unnoticed.
Attending to the selective criminalization of patterns reveals the rather
jarring likelihood that departure from relationship is required to manifest
nonconsent to violence. Before the breakup, ongoing violence of a nonphysical
nature is not a crime, because victims who stay are believed to consent to the
harm. Only when women leave do their experiences of continuing harm find
outlet in the law.
This dual treatment cannot be justified. Because the normative
requirements of consent do not map onto the conditions of abuse, the
significance of separation falters under conceptual analysis. Deconstructing the
legal meaning of breakups begins to undo the criminalization gap, which has
the effect of affording relatively limited protection to women in violent
relationships.35 ' For now, our criminal justice system's response to violence
against women remains an incomplete evolution.
APPENDIX: MODEL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE STATUTE352
A person is guilty of Domestic Violence when:
He or she intentionally engages in a course of conduct directed at a family
or household member; and
He or she knows or reasonably should know that such conduct is likely to
result in substantial power or control over the family or household member
[alternately, tracking the language of the Model Stalking Code and many state
350. By identifying a partial exemption for relationship violence, this Article lays the groundwork
for further exploring limitations in the law's response to violence between intimates.
35 1. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
352. This statutory definition which would not supplant any existing laws or preclude the ability
of prosecutors to charge them instead where appropriate-might well constitute the lowest degree of
domestic violence. A reasonable penal classification scheme would use this statutory language as a
basis for enhancing the degree of the crime in relation to the presence of certain aggravating factors
enumerated by statute. Such aggravating factors might include the use of a weapon, infliction of
physical injury or serious physical injury, the commission of a predicate act that is defined as felonious,
or a prior conviction for domestic violence.
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stalking statutes: He or she knows or reasonably should know that such conduct
would cause a reasonable person to (a) fear for his or her safety or the safety of
a third person; or (b) suffer other emotional distress]; and
At least two acts comprising the course of conduct constitute a crime in
this jurisdiction.
Definitions
"Family or household member," means spouses, former spouses, an adult
with whom the actor is or has been in a continuing relationship of a sexual or
otherwise intimate nature, and adults who have a child in common regardless of
whether they have been married or have resided together at any time.
"Course of conduct" means a pattern of conduct comprised of a series of
acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose.
"Crime" means a misdemeanor or a felony.
